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4Chapter 1
Introduction
Work is a fundamental value of the Italian Constitution: the ﬁrst article says
”Italy is a democratic republic founded on labour”.
The workers losing their job, have to face a very diﬃcult situation in
particular when the labour market is depressed. For this reason the wel-
fare system introduces employment protection legislation and unemployment
beneﬁts in order to protect the individuals against uninsurable labour mar-
ket risk. The ﬁrst makes the dismissal of the workers more diﬃcult for the
employer, while the latter acts as replacement income for the worker experi-
encing unemployment spell when he looses his job.
In this thesis we will focus on re-employment policies. Re-employment
policies could have both a passive component when they support workers
in their ﬁrst period of unemployment and an active component for their
relocation in the labour market. These policies sometimes are very expensive
and not very eﬀective on transitions from unemployment to work. Therefore
this ﬁeld in the last thirty years became subject of many experiments and
studies, focused on understanding their impact on re-employment according
to diﬀerent incentives. All these programmes are diﬀerent in length, amount
and type of incentives. Incentives could be bonuses re-employment or beneﬁt
sanctions, like reduction of beneﬁts level for workers who do not respect the
programme rules. In this thesis we deal only with bonus re-employment. In
particular we focus on an Italian labour programme, called Liste di mobilit´ a
(LM).
This programme, introduced in the Nineties, is a particular welfare tool
that provides incentives both for workers and for employers who hire workers
enrolled in LM. LM were introduced mainly to face situations of collective
dismissals caused by reduction, transformation or cessation of the activity of
a ﬁrm. This programme combines both active and passive components and
has diﬀerent features depending on the dismissing ﬁrm’s size and worker’s age
5at dismissal. The active component is applied for all workers enrolled in LM,
while the passive component is applied only to workers collectively dismissed
by large ﬁrms. The aim of this programme is to facilitate the re-entering
in the labour market, but its eﬀects evaluation is diﬃcult because there is
no control group. Therefore analyses evaluating the impact diﬀerences on
workers submitted to diﬀerent treatments or with diﬀerent characteristics
are carried out.
Previous studies show that beneﬁts do not always work in the right direc-
tion; sometimes the income support has a negative eﬀect on the probability
of ﬁnding a job. Re-employment is more diﬃcult for older workers, even if
this programme tries to give them more incentives. Women too are more
discriminated in the labour market.
In this thesis we want to study how incentives for workers and ﬁrms
inﬂuence the unemployment duration. We want to analyse if the bonuses,
supporting worker’s income during the unemployment period, have a negative
eﬀect on the re-employment probability. This negative eﬀect could be due to
two reasons: workers may take more time for looking for a better job or, with
an opportunistic behaviour, they may see bonuses like an income and so a
reason for remaining unemployed. It could be that this negative eﬀect is hold
down by the active component of the programme which transfers the beneﬁt
from worker to the hiring ﬁrm. Concerning employers, we want to understand
which type of workers they, considering their incentives, prefer to hire and
with which type of contract. In particular we will focus on hirings with
permanent contract. We are mostly interested on the eﬀect of the monetary
beneﬁts on unemployment duration, which could be considered both an active
and a passive component. In order to understand the eﬀect of the additional
year of older workers on re-employment, we restrict our sample to workers
aged between 38 and 41 years old. In this way we eliminate possible eﬀects
caused by age and we can take in account of the diﬀerences between workers
below or above the threshold of 40 years old, caused by the diﬀerent length of
the programme. Finally we carry out some exploratory analyses in order to
observe if the programme aﬀects the quality of job, in terms of wage increase
or reduction, compared to the wage of the job which causes the entrance in
LM. In other words we want to study how the length of the search for a new
job is related to a better or worse job and if the ﬁnal results is inﬂuenced by
the diﬀerent features of the programme.
For this study we use data from Giove, a database coming from Centri
per l’impiego of the Veneto region and from VMH, a database from INPS
archive. The linkage between the two datasets permit us to have richer data
on workers as social demographic characteristics (gender, age, education);
working history of the previous job (salary, qualiﬁcation, size of the ﬁrm)
6and eventually of the subsequent job (type of contract, date of hiring and for
a smaller sample also the wage after three years).
We analyse only workers younger than 49, because for workers above this
threshold the situation is more complex. Sometimes they exploit an adding
programme called Mobilit´ a lunga, that can be considered as a bridge to the
retirement.
The frame of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 describes labour mar-
ket policies and their possible eﬀects on the probability of re-employment.
Chapter 3 is an overview of the previous studies in the United States and
in Netherlands. Chapter 4 describes the Italian labour market programme,
Liste di mobilit´ a, ﬁrst explaining the main features of the programme and
then with a short summary of previous studies. Chapter 5 describes the
data and provides some summary statistics. In chapter 6 some exploratory
analyses are reported. Chapter 7 presents empirical analyses and chapter 8
presents the conclusions.
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Labour market policies
Labour market policies can be divided in active and passive policies. They
are classiﬁed by Eurostat into nine categories:
1. Public employment services and administration
2. Training
3. Job rotation and job sharing
4. Employment incentives
5. Supported employment and rehabilitation
6. Direct job creation
7. Start-up incentives
8. Out-of-work income maintenance and support
9. Early retirement
The ﬁrst seven categories are active policies, the last two are passive
policies. In this thesis we are interested in unemployment policies, thus we
start looking at the general eﬀects of these policies by paying attention to
beneﬁt system which in Italy is the biggest component of passive policies
in Italy. Then we will describe unemployment policies in Italy and we will
conclude with a comparison between Italian and European expenditure for
these policies.
92.1 Unemployment policies
Let us examine the aim of unemployment policies, which can be both active
and passive [Sestito, 2001]. Aim of active policies is to assist people to come
back in the labour market. The purpose of these policies is not only to
increase the number of employed people, but also to provide unemployed
people with training in order to improve their qualiﬁcation and let them ﬁnd
a better job in terms of qualiﬁcation and wage.
The aim of passive policies is to decrease the uneasiness caused by unem-
ployment; their purpose is not to increase employment but to protect help-
less workers. Passive policies act in a double way: they have an insurance
function which provides a support to ﬁred workers in term of income and a
distribution function which prevents the level of income of some individuals
from falling below a minimum level essential in their entire life cycle. These
policies should improve the quality of employment; in fact with a temporary
support workers could perform a more careful and aware search of a new job.
In this way there will be a better matching between supply and demand.
However there is also a negative eﬀect; in fact incentives reduce the active
search of a new job. An unemployed will accept a new job oﬀer if the wage
is above his reservation wage.
The reservation wage is:
WR = {Pr(W > WR)E(W|W > WR)} + b (2.1)
where b is the beneﬁt, W is the wage, Pr() and E() are respectively the
probability and the expected value of the function [Sestito, 2001].
Therefore they will accept a new job if the oﬀered wage is at least equal
to the monetary beneﬁts plus the advantage given by continuing the search.
This advantage is the possibility to ﬁnd a job with a bigger wage than the
oﬀered one and it is calculated multiplying the expected value of bigger wages
by the probability to ﬁnd them.
From equation 2.1 we notice that the reservation wage is a positive func-
tion of the monetary beneﬁt (the only sure beneﬁt which workers renounce if
they accept the job oﬀer). Moreover there is a positive relationship between
unemployment and the reservation wage, because if the reservation wage is
higher, the probability to accept a new job oﬀer (with a wage bigger than the
reservation wage) will be smaller. By the way it does not imply that more
qualiﬁed workers will stay longer unemployed, because they will probably
receive better oﬀers. Actually the equation 2.1 consider the average wage
level available in the labour market (according with worker qualiﬁcation),
that represent a realistic level that the worker could achieve continuing the
10search. Finally we can conclude that there is a positive correlation between
monetary beneﬁt and the probability to stay unemployed.
Fig. 2.1: Active and passive policies eﬀects [Sestito, 2001]
The eﬀect of active and passive policies can be showed to act on unem-
ployment and real wages as represented in ﬁgure 2.1 [Sestito, 2001]. Passive
policies increase the real wage in the short period, but they reduce employ-
ment both in the long and short period. Instead active policies work in the
opposite way, raising the level of employment. The problem of policy maker
could be seen as a trade-oﬀ between insurance and employment purposes. In
this thesis we focus on beneﬁt system ”Liste di mobilit` a”, which is mostly a
passive policy, but mixed with an active component.
2.1.1 Beneﬁt system
Among labour policies it is worth to study the beneﬁt system. The ﬁrst
unemployment beneﬁt system was introduced in the United Kingdom in 1911,
but many people did not like that persons not working could receive money
by the State. Nowadays all the OECD countries and an increasing number
of countries in the world, even middle-income countries with serious ﬁscal
constraints, have or are introducing unemployment beneﬁt systems. They
try to provide more protection against income ﬂuctuation due to job loss
via unemployment beneﬁt system rather than via employment protection
legislation. These schemes are very popular among workers, but they also
increase welfare of society, because they improve the allocation of human
11capital and so economic growth. By the way these beneﬁts should not be too
generous in order to not discourage the job search.
These beneﬁt systems are diﬀerent in features among countries. They
diﬀer in eligibility (the norms determining access to the beneﬁt) and entitle-
ment (the rules concerning the duration and the level of payment). Usually
job losers with short unemployment duration receive beneﬁts that are pro-
portional to their past contributions. Another component of unemployment
beneﬁt system is the unemployment assistance, typically oﬀered at a ﬂat rate
(independent of the previous wage). Unemployment assistance can also be
integrated with general social assistance, which is oﬀered for unlimited du-
ration to unemployed individuals who have incomes and family assets lower
than a given poverty threshold [Boeri and van Ours, 2008].
2.2 Unemployment policies in Italy
In Italy unemployed workers can take advantage both of active and passive
policies. First of all we shortly look at active policies and then we see more
in detail passive policies, which are mostly directed to ﬁred workers. The
main active policies in Italy are [Sestito, 2001]:
• particular kinds of contract, as apprenticeship (apprendistato, contratti
di formazione-lavoro)
• training and work experiences, as internship and qualifying period
• advantages for hiring ﬁrms as cut in social security contributions. This
is a component of the programme Liste di mobilit` a.
• direct job creation
Beyond these policies, ﬁred workers can be involved in diﬀerent passive pro-
grammes in order to support their income during unemployment. These
programmes have diﬀerent requirements for participation. Depending on the
programme [Anastasia et al., 2011], workers will receive diﬀerent amount of
beneﬁts.
2.2.1 Indennit` a ordinaria di disoccupazione con req-
uisiti pieni
The indennit` a ordinaria di disoccupazione con requisiti pieni (ordinary un-
employment beneﬁts with full requirements) programme was introduced in
121919 as insurance against involuntary unemployment. Fired workers can en-
joy up to 8 months (12 for workers older than 50 years). The amount of
beneﬁts is a percentage of the previous wage and it was equal to the 30%
in 1996, 40% in 2001 and in 2008 it arrived at 60% of the previous wage
[Anastasia et al., 2011]. Recipients are all ﬁred workers (not self-employed
workers) who paid at least 52 weeks of contributions in the last two years
and with at least two years of compulsory insurance against unemployment.
Accessibility to this programme also depends on the kind of contract, for
example workers with an apprenticeship contract are excluded.
2.2.2 Indennit` a di disoccupazione agricola ed edile
The Indennit` a di disoccupazione agricola (unemployment beneﬁts for farm-
ers) programme was introduced in the middle of the Fifties and it is an
insurance against farmer unemployment. This programme was an important
intervention to help needy families. Recipients were farmers who worked at
least 51 days during the year and they could enjoy 40% of their wage during
the period they were enrolled in suitable lists.
In 1970 was also introduced the Indennit` a di disoccupazione edile (un-
employment builder’s labourer beneﬁts), in order to support their income.
The maximum length of this programme is up to 90 days with a maximum
amount of 579 e.
2.2.3 Indennit` a ordinaria di disoccupazione a requisiti
ridotti
The Indennit` a ordinaria di disoccupazione a requisiti ridotti (ordinary unem-
ployment beneﬁts with restricted requirements) programme was introduced
in 1980 in order to support income of temporary and seasonal workers ex-
cluded by previous programmes. Fired workers can receive 35 % of the pre-
vious wage during the ﬁrst four months and then during the ﬁfth and the
sixth month the bonus increase to 40 %. Sometimes workers could enjoy
both this programme and the one with full requirements. In this case they
have to decide between these two programme; the advantage of the ﬁrst one
(full requirements) is that workers could enjoy a bigger bonus, instead the
advantage of the second one is that there is no interval between the dismissal
and the beginning of the bonus.
132.2.4 Cassa integrazione guadagni
A special public fund Cassa Integrazione Guadagni CIG (wages guarantee
fund) used to protect workers’ income, ﬁnanced by companies and the state
was established since 1945. The CIG provides the pay of workers aﬀected by
lay-oﬀs or short-time working, up to 80% of the lost pay. In industry, the
Fund operates through two forms of intervention (ordinary and special), gov-
erned by a series of laws. Payments under ordinary intervention are granted
to workers who have been suspended by work because of immediate circum-
stances which cannot be blamed either on the employer or on the employees,
or because of temporary market situations. Payments under special inter-
vention are granted to workers who have been ﬁred because of company
reorganization, restructuring or conversion, or a company’s economic diﬃ-
culties that are of particular social importance as regards local employment.
In this programme the relationship between the employer and the employee
is maintained with hope of a future upturn in work. Originally it was in-
troduced as means of temporary income protection for employees, in the
expectation that the company and its employees would soon resume normal
activity. Afterwards it has gradually been extended even to cases in which
there is no prospect of a return to the normal production and work pattern,
so that it has in fact become a welfare instrument for the management of
labour surpluses.
2.2.5 Liste di mobilit` a
The Liste di mobilit` a LM (mobility list) programme was introduced in 1991.
It is the most proﬁtable unemployment programme in term of duration and
amount of beneﬁts. Workers can receive the beneﬁts if they worked at least
for one year with a permanent contract and they are ﬁred because of reduction
or cessation of their ﬁrm activity. We will see more in detail the features of
this programme in chapter 4.
2.2.6 Recent regional programmes in order to extend
the amount of recipients.
During last years (2009-2011) in order to face the diﬃcult situation caused by
the crisis, some new programmes have been introduced to extend the access to
unemployment beneﬁts. These programmes are experimental and they try to
assist apprentices and lavoratori a progetto (temporary workers). Apprentices
who worked at least three months could enjoy 60 % of the previous wage
(sometimes also 80 %) at maximum for 90 days; lavoratori a progetto who
14satisfy some particular requirements could enjoy 30 % of the previous wage
of the last year, up to 4000 e.
Moreover regions, according to the amount of available resources, intro-
duced others programmes devoted to ﬁred workers. The aim of these new
programmes is to help workers excluded by the previous ones.
2.3 Unemployment expenditure in Europe
In this section we want to compare unemployment expenditure in Europe
with the Italian one. Figure 2.2 shows the amount of social expenditure
Fig. 2.2: Public unemployment spending as % of GDP [Oecd, 2010]
for unemployment policies during years 2000, 2003 and 2007. The source
of these statistics is an OECD database and in this table we report data of
some OECD European Countries [Oecd, 2010].
During the three years the level of Italian expenditure on unemployment
policies was constant. It is 0,4 % of GDP and it is one of the lowest level
of expenditure in Europe. We have a similar level in Estonia, Greece, UK,
Hungary and Czech Republic. In Belgium and Denmark we have the highest
level of public social expenditure, around 3 % of GDP. By the way in Denmark
in 2007 the level is decreased at 1,9 % of GDP.
These statistics have to be compared with the level of unemployment in
European countries in those years reported in ﬁgure 2.3. Also relating the
unemployment expenditure with unemployment rate we can conclude that
the expenditure level for unemployment in Italy is lower than the mean of
European OECD countries.
15Fig. 2.3: Unemployment rate [Oecd, 2010]
16Chapter 3
Previous studies on
unemployment beneﬁts
As we saw in the previous chapter, unemployment policies and in particular
unemployment beneﬁts are a very common tool used by welfare systems in
order to sustain income of unemployed and to help ﬁred workers for their re-
location in the labour market. By the way these policies sometimes are very
expensive and not very eﬀective on transitions from unemployment to work.
Therefore in the last thirty years, this ﬁeld became subject of many experi-
ments and studies, focusing on understanding their impact on re-employment,
according to diﬀerent incentives. In this chapter we examine the results ob-
tained by these experiments, in the Unites States and in Netherlands.
3.1 American studies
In the United States, in order to assist involuntary unemployed, there is
the unemployment insurance (UI) which provides short-term monetary assis-
tance. It provides unemployment beneﬁts to eligible workers who are unem-
ployed, but not by their fault. Eligibility, beneﬁt amounts and duration are
determined by the Federal law. Usually beneﬁts are based on a percentage
of an individual’s earnings over a recent 52-week period; in most States can
be paid for a maximum of 26 weeks. Additional weeks of beneﬁts may be
available during periods of high unemployment. A frequent criticism of this
system has been that the unemployment insurance beneﬁt acts as disincentive
for job seekers and prolongs the duration of unemployment insurance spells.
During the 1980’s some experiments of alternative compensation scheme for
UI have been tested in the US.
During 1984-1985 two experiments [Woodbury and Spiegelman, 1987] were
17conducted in Illinois. In the ﬁrst experiment a random sample of new UI
claimants were informed that they would qualify for a bonus of $500, if they
found a job of 30 hours or more per week within 11 weeks of ﬁling the claim.
They could enjoy this bonus if they retrained the new job for at least 4
months. In the second experiment a random sample of new claimants was
told that their next employer would be entitled to a bonus of $500 if the
claimants were able to ﬁnd a job and keep it under the same conditions of
the previous experiment. The two treatments were tested against a control
group of claimants who followed the usual rules of the Illinois UI system. The
authors found that in the ﬁrst experiment the re-employment bonus reduced
unemployment duration by approximately one week and reduced paid state
regular beneﬁts by an average of $158. The second experiment had a much
smaller eﬀect. The post-unemployment earnings of members of the treat-
ment group didn’t diﬀer from the earnings of members of the control group.
Since the Illinois experiment was successful in reducing UI payments, the US
Department of Labour sponsored others experiments to further investigate
the use of a re-employment bonus in the UI system.
During 1986-1987 a re-employment bonus experiment was conducted in
New Jersey [Anderson, 1992]. In this experiment UI claimants were ran-
domly assigned to one of three treatment groups or to a control group. All
UI claimants in treatment groups were assigned to job-search assistance ac-
tivities. One treatment group was oﬀered a cash bonus for ﬁnding a new job.
During the ﬁrst two weeks the bonus was equal to one half of the remaining
UI entitlement for a claimant; after that the bonus amount declined by 10%
of the original amount each week, falling to zero in the eleventh week of un-
employment after the initial oﬀer. A second group was oﬀered assistance in
getting into a job-training programme, or in relocation, but no cash bonus.
A third group was oﬀered nothing after the job-search assistance activities.
The authors found out that the eﬀect of a bonus on the job ﬁnding rate is
signiﬁcantly positive at the beginning of the oﬀer period when the bonus was
larger.
Both the New Jersey and Illinois experiments oﬀered re-employment bo-
nuses to UI claimants, but one important diﬀerence is that the Illinois bonus
was constant over time, in contrast the New Jersey bonus declined over time,
so that the bonus received was greater the earlier that re-employment oc-
curred. The declining bonus creates a direct incentive for claimants to shorten
unemployment spells to less than the full duration of the bonus qualiﬁcation
period [Decker, 1994].
During 1988-1989 bonus experiments were conducted also in Pennsyl-
vania and Washington to test other type of re-employment bonus oﬀers
[Decker and O’Leary, 1995]. Pennsylvania and Washington tested some dif-
18ferent experiments, which diﬀered by the amount of the bonus oﬀer and the
period which an individual was qualiﬁed to receive the bonus. Pennsylvania
tested four diﬀerent bonus oﬀers based on two alternative bonus amounts and
two alternative qualiﬁcation period, instead Washington compared six diﬀer-
ent experiments based on three alternative bonus amount and two alternative
qualiﬁcation period. The authors ﬁnd that more generous bonus oﬀers gener-
ated larger impacts than did less generous oﬀers; in particular the treatment
with a higher bonus oﬀer and a longer qualiﬁcation period reduced unem-
ployment duration of 0,76 weeks. All these experiments have similar impact
on average UI receipt and earnings among eligible claimants. The impacts on
UI receipt were statistically signiﬁcant but relatively modest. The average
impact of the bonus oﬀers on earnings was extremely small and not statis-
tically signiﬁcant. Findings of these experiments are contrary to ﬁndings in
the Illinois experiment. These experiments suggest that the re-employment
bonus is not a cost-eﬀective method of speeding the re-employment of UI
claimants.
Following studies on Illinois experiments suggest that the diﬀerence be-
tween the treatment and the control exit rates is positive during the period
of bonus eligibility and rise just before the end of the eligibility period. One
weakness of that programme is that the absence of an eﬀect of the bonus
on re-employment earnings. It suggests a greater role for changes in search
intensity than changes in reservation wages.
3.2 Dutch studies
In the Netherlands there are welfare beneﬁts in order to support unemployed
workers who are not entitled to any other social insurance beneﬁts. Unem-
ployment insurance pays 70 per cent of the last earned wage for a period of
time dependent on age and on their work history, which varies between 3 and
38 months. Welfare beneﬁts recipients are often long-term unemployed with
poor labour market prospects and beneﬁts are related to the family situation,
but not limited in duration.
Since 1997, to increase their transition from welfare to work, beneﬁt re-
cipients in the municipality of Rotterdam were exposed to various ﬁnancial
incentives. The eﬀects of this programme is studied over the period 2000-2003
in [van der Klaauw and van Ours, 2010].
During this period, the re-employment rules changed frequently. The
rules were related to accepting regular jobs in the years 2001, 2002 and 2003.
If they found a job during 2001 they were entitled to a maximum of 1800e,
to be paid in four equal amounts of 450e, each six months after the start of
19the job and only if they remained employed. If they found a job during 2002,
they were entitled to a re-employment tax rebate of maximum 2269eover a
period of three years. If they found a job after January 2003, they did not
receive re-employment bonuses.
The authors ﬁnd that re-employment bonuses do not seem have a sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on the job ﬁnding rate and there is a low take-up rate of the
bonuses (not due to the lack of information). Might be that people assign a
lower value to beneﬁts because of the delay in payment.
3.3 Conclusions
The main diﬀerence between US experiments and the Rotterdam programme
is that in the US bonuses were paid to workers who ﬁnd job quickly; instead
in Rotterdam welfare recipients become entitled for a re-employment bonus
after being unemployed for at least one year. Aim of the Dutch strategy
is to avoid giving bonus to workers who would have found a job anyway.
Bonus experiments in Rotterdam do not seem have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
probability to ﬁnd a job, probably for the delay in payment. Furthermore
they support only workers who do not ﬁnd a job during the ﬁrst year, so they
try to help only workers with a more diﬃcult situation. Actually with this
programme we can see better eﬀectiveness of the policy, because it excludes
workers that would have found a job anyway. However the results between
Netherlands and America are quite similar: the eﬀectiveness of all these
programmes are often positive but, in magnitude, the eﬀect is low. From
these studies we learnt that declining bonuses are more eﬀective than constant
bonuses, because they incentive more workers to not remain unemployed.
American experiments include also control groups, so it is easier to evalu-
ate the impact with respect to the Italian programme we are going to study.
The American programme, most similar to the LM, is the experiment in New
Jersey, where workers were entitled to income support during unemployment
(passive component) and they enjoy some assistance in looking for a job
(active component). In New Jersey bonuses were decreasing and thus an
incentive to reduce unemployment spell was created. Also in Italy bonuses
are decreasing, but they change every year and not every month.
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Liste di mobilit` a
4.1 Set-up of Liste di mobilit` a
In 1991 the Italian Parliament promulgated the law 223, which introduced
new regulation for the labour market. One important innovation introduced
by this law is the reintegration of collective dismissals. Collective dismissals
can be applied by ﬁrms with more than 15 employees that, due to a reduction,
a transformation or the cessation of the activity, want to dismiss at least 5
workers in 120 days. This law introduced a new safety valve, called Liste di
mobilit` a (LM), in order to assist collectively dismissed workers.
This programme includes both a passive and an active component. The
passive component is an income support that the worker receives if he/she is
registered in the LM. The important innovation of this labour programme is
the active component, like reductions in labour costs, which includes advan-
tages for the ﬁrms who hire dismissed.
In 1993 the law 236 extended the participation to the programme also
to workers individually dismissed by small ﬁrms. They could participate on
voluntary basis, but they do not receive the income support.
This programme is an important innovation compared to the previous
Cassa integrazioni guadagni (see section 2.2) where workers received only
the passive component. With the previous programme workers were not
motivated to look for a new job also because that they felt attached to the
previous ﬁrm. In fact workers entered in the programme they were not deﬁni-
tively ﬁred. Hence many workers receiving an income support did not look
for a new job, hoping in a re-employment in the previous ﬁrm. With the LM,
workers are ﬁnally ﬁred and so they are induced to start searching a new job.
214.1.1 Condition for enrolment and eligibility duration
The LM programme establishes that ﬁrms with more than 15 employees
may dismiss redundant workers and automatically register them in a special
register maintained by a regional authority. The programme helps ﬁrms to
face situation of crises, allowing them to reduce the personnel with collective
dismissal. Workers dismissed by small ﬁrms, with up to 15 employees, may
enter in the list but on voluntary basis.
In order to be eligible for the list, workers must have been hired with a
permanent contract with the dismissing ﬁrm at least 1 year before and with
at least six months of eﬀective work in the ﬁrm (including holidays, accidents,
etc).
The eligibility period varies with the worker age at time of dismissal; it
lasts:
• 1 year for workers younger than 40 years old
• 2 years for workers between 40 and 49 years old
• 3 years for workers older than 49, or even longer when workers are
getting close to being eligible for retirement beneﬁts.
In south Italy, the periods last respectively 2, 3 and 4 years.
Workers in the LM should carry out some obligations with respect to
training and job oﬀers. If a worker refuses an appropriate job oﬀer (consid-
ering the position and the wage of the previous work) by the local public
labour exchange, he is dropped from the programme. Anyway these rules
are not often applied, thus workers can refuse job oﬀers. Workers enrolled in
the LM could work for short time (up to 12 months on temporary contract)
without compromise their maximum duration of stay in list. Indeed income
support and LM duration are temporary frozen up to the end of the contract
with the return in list.
4.1.2 The active and the passive component of the pro-
gramme
As we saw at the beginning of this chapter the LM programme is composed
by an active and a passive component.
The passive component is enjoyed only by workers dismissed by large
ﬁrms. During the stay in LM they are entitled to income support. These
beneﬁts are interrupted if the worker is hired and last up to the maximum
stay in list. They vary according with the worker’s age.
22year benchmark net pay gross wage
1997 below 2,994,924£ 1,300,730£ 1,384,344£
above 1,563,351£ 1,663,847£
1998 below 3,036,374£ 1,325,749£ 1,403,503£
above 1,593,422£ 1,686,875£
1999 below 3,080,098£ 1,344,839£ 1,423,713£
above 1,616,367£ 1,711,166£
2000 below 3,119,030£ 1,361,838£ 1,441,709£
above 1,636,798£ 1,732,795£
2001 below 3,182,908£ 1,389,729£ 1,471,235£
above 1,670,320£ 1,768,283£
2002 below 1,679.07e 733.12e 776.12e
above 881.14e 932.82e
2003 below 1,711.70e 747.38e 791.21e
above 898.27e 950.95e
Table 4.1: Summary table of ceilings during 1997-2003 [Inps, 2011].
Workers younger than 40 years old enjoy one year of income support,
instead workers between 40 and 49 years old enjoy two years of beneﬁt.
Income support is equal to 80% of the previous pay during the ﬁrst year and
is reduced to 64% during the second and the third year (ﬁgure 4.1), with a
ceiling that varies over time. In fact the amount of beneﬁt can not exceed a
ceiling ﬁxed every year. Ceilings are divided in two ranges depending on the
previous wage. In table 4.1 we can see the two ceilings from 1997 to 2003,
depending on a benchmark ﬁxed every year. For example if a worker in 2003
entered in LM because ﬁred from a job where he earned a wage larger than
1,711.70e, then he will earn 80% of the previous wage. Nevertheless if this
amount exceeds the ceiling (950.95e), he will receive just 950.95e. While,
if the worker’s previous wage was below 1,711.70e, then the ceiling will be
791.21e.
Looking at the ceilings we observe that workers with high wage receive a
beneﬁt deﬁnitely smaller than the 80% of the previous wage.
On the other side, as we saw in chapter 2, workers dismissed by small
ﬁrms could receive just the standard UI, that is 30% or 40% of their last
wage up to 6 months.
The active component of the programme consists in beneﬁts given to
employers who hire enrolled workers from the LM. It consists in a reduction
of social security contribution (SSC) and in an amount of the remaining
bonus of the worker (if the worker enjoyed the beneﬁt). The advantage of
the reduction in SSC is diﬀerent according to the type of contract adopted
by the ﬁrm hiring the worker:
23Fig. 4.1: incentives for workers to stay in LM.
• If ﬁrms hire workers on a temporary contract (up to 12 months), ﬁrms
enjoy 12 month in cut SSC.
• If ﬁrms hire workers on a temporary contract and then they switch it
into a permanent one, cut in SSC can last up to 2 years.
• If ﬁrms hire workers immediately on a permanent contract, they enjoy
18 months of cut in SSC.
In addition ﬁrms receive a beneﬁt equal to 50% of the remaining bonus that
workers would have received had they remained in the list. The maximum
beneﬁt transfer is equal to the 50% of total amount of the monetary beneﬁt
of at most one year.
If employers hire workers without beneﬁt they enjoy only cut in social
security contribution. Therefore the best strategy for ﬁrms is to hire a worker
with beneﬁt with a temporary contract and then switch it into a permanent
one.
In ﬁgures 4.2 and 4.3 we can observe the incentives for ﬁrms1.
The diﬀerence of incentives for employers hiring a worker 40 − 49 years
old with bonus instead of a worker younger than 40 is that they have an
1Incentives for employers are computed using a study of Rettore, Paggiaro, Trivellato
(2009). They are the percentage of labour savings (respect of the total labour cost) over
two years for ﬁrm hiring a worker in LM. The assumption used for these estimates is that
the annual gross wage is 13000 e
24Firm size
workers collectively
dismissed by large
ﬁrm ( ≥ 15 )
workers collectively
dismissed by small
ﬁrm (< 15)
age of dismissal <40 40-49 <40 40-49
eligibility duration
(year)
1 2 1 2
monetary beneﬁts 80% 80% ﬁrst year,
64% second year
- -
rebate on SSC’s 18 - 24 months
beneﬁts transfer to
hiring ﬁrm
50% of one year at most - -
Table 4.2: Summary table about incentives for ﬁrms [Paggiaro et al., 2009].
Fig. 4.2: Incentives for employers to hire workers enrolled in LM younger
than 40 years old with a permanent contract.
25Fig. 4.3: Incentives for employers to hire workers enrolled in LM older than
40 years old with a permanent contract.
additional year for hiring the worker (because the spell in the LM for these
workers is of two year).
During the ﬁrst month the incentives are the same, then until the end of
the ﬁrst year they are a little higher for the workers aged 40 − 49 because
the period of bonus received by the worker is two years and by the employer
is half of it up to 1 year. During the second year it is convenient to hire a
worker aged 40 − 49 because there are no incentives for those younger than
40.
4.2 Previous studies on LM
There are several studies on the LM programme, because it has a considerable
role in the ﬁeld of labour policies and for the uncertainty of its eﬀectiveness.
All these studies diﬀers with respect to analysed regions, methods and results,
but they use all the same kind of data: administrative regional archive of LM.
Since there is not an appropriate control group, analyses are concentrated on
diﬀerences between diﬀerent treatments received by workers, varying accord-
ing to worker’s age and to the size of the ﬁrms which the workers belonged
to. It is important to distinguish the eﬀect of the treatment (one year more
in the LM) from the eﬀect of the age, which tend to combine together.
26Most analyses show that remaining one more year in the LM has a nega-
tive eﬀect, maybe because older workers are more selective in accepting a new
job (they have a higher reservation wage). Although the programme gives
them more incentives, the negative eﬀect caused by the age is not eliminated.
Usually studies exclude people with more than 49 years old, because some
of them in the list are only waiting for retirement. The main studies on LM
are about the duration of stay in the list and the probability to ﬁnd a new
job according to workers’ features and LM rules.
A study about length of stay in the list [Brunello and Miniaci, 1997b],
conducted in Lombardia, ﬁnds out that bonuses tend to extend the duration
of stay in list, in particular for workers of higher age. To avoid this negative
eﬀect, the real search and job acceptance by workers and the possible partici-
pation at market of undeclared work should be checked. In the same year and
still in Lombardia, Brunello and Miniaci conducted another study related to
workers between 40-49 years old [Brunello and Miniaci, 1997a]. They observe
that conditionally to workers’ age, an additional year of beneﬁts reduces the
probability to ﬁnd a new job, in particular for women. Despite this favourable
treatment for older workers, the negative eﬀects caused by bigger reservation
wages prevails on the positive eﬀects due to the larger beneﬁts given to the
ﬁrms hiring them.
From a study [Borzaga and Carpita, 1997] conducted in Veneto and in
the province of Trento, we observe that the probability to ﬁnd a new job for
workers enrolled in LM depends on the characteristics of workers (on the side
of the supply) and of ﬁrms which discriminate older and less skilled workers
(on the side of the demand). If the labour market is dynamic, there will be
more possibility of ﬁnding a new job and fewer diﬀerences between men and
women. From this study the passive element of the policy (beneﬁt) does not
seem to have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the probability of ﬁnding a new
job.
A study about LM in Veneto [Franceschini and Trivellato, 1998], notices
that the bonus has a negative eﬀect and it reduces chances of re-employment
for workers older than 40 years old and in particular for those older than 50
years old. For workers younger than 40 years old, the bonus works like an
active component of the policy, because it increases the probability to leave
the LM. A possible cause could be that ﬁrms prefer younger workers and
that older workers enjoy bonus for long period, so they are less stimulated to
look for a new job.
In another study still in Veneto [Paggiaro and Trivellato, 2002], the au-
thors ﬁnd that the transfer of the bonus from workers to ﬁrms has not a
dominant role, because the advantage obtained by the ﬁrms by the cuts in
social security contributions is bigger. The SSC’s cut is invariant with the
27size of the ﬁrm which the worker belonged to, with worker’s age and the
time spent in LM. Moreover the authors aﬃrm that the facility for ﬁrms to
cumulate social security reductions, by hiring on temporary contracts and
then transforming them into permanent ones, is used.
A study about LM in Umbria [Caruso, 2001] notices that, the longer is
the period allowed in staying in list, the most negative is the eﬀect of the
bonus. This eﬀect is associates with the negative eﬀect of age; even if the
bonus is bigger, workers are discriminated by ﬁrms for their age and they are
more selective with the new job oﬀers because they have a higher reservation
wage.
In another study still in Umbria [Caruso and Pisauro, 2005], the authors
study the duration of unemployment. They face the problem of opportunistic
behaviours of ﬁrms; in fact ﬁrms ﬁre some workers and then they recall the
same from the LM in order to achieve incentives in cut is SSC. They ﬁnd
out that there is a negative dependence between unemployment duration
and recall from the previous employer, while there is no dependence between
unemployment duration and new jobs.
In a study in Turin [Martini and Costabella, 2007] opportunistic behav-
iour of ﬁrms and of unemployed are analysed. They ﬁnd out a non negligible
number of ﬁrms who fraudulently dismiss their workers to rehire them soon
afterwards under a diﬀerent ﬁrm denomination. They also ﬁnd a strong
negative eﬀect of the receipt of income support on the probability of re-
employment. Such negative eﬀect increases strongly with the age of the
worker.
One of the most recent studies about LM is carried out by Paggiaro,
Trivellato and Rettore in 2009. In this research they study the impact of ex-
tending the duration of eligibility on re-employment probabilities and wages.
They ﬁnd that for most subgroups there is no signiﬁcant impact, except a
small negative one for women at the 40-years threshold (which could be at-
tributed to family commitments in particular if they have young children)
and a signiﬁcant negative one for workers aged 50 years or more, probably
because they use this programme as a bridge to retirement. Finally they
conclude that more generous provision for older workers do not help in get-
ting them back to work, but it just makes the programme more expensive
[Paggiaro et al., 2009].
4.3 Conclusion
Looking at features of the LM and at previous studies we learnt that treat-
ment is diﬀerent mostly according to the size of the dismissing ﬁrms which
28workers belonged to. However is diﬃcult to ﬁnd the real eﬀect of diﬀerent
treatments because the two groups are not randomly assigned, so we do not
have a control group. The treatment diﬀers also according to the age of dis-
missed workers; in particular incentives are longer for older workers. These
bigger incentives are not enough to ﬁll the diﬀerences caused by age, in fact
for older workers it is more diﬃcult to leave the LM. Incentives for workers
are constant during the ﬁrst year of stay in LM, then during the second and
the third year they are reduced and they are enjoyed only by older workers.
Incentives for ﬁrms are mostly related to cuts in social security contribution,
which are enjoyed when workers enrolled in LM are hired. However incentives
are bigger when workers who enjoy bonus are hired, in particular if they are
at the beginning of the stay in LM. Although incentives are larger for workers
who receive beneﬁts, from the previous studies we observe that bonuses do
not have always a positive signiﬁcant eﬀect on re-employment rate and that
an additional year of beneﬁts for older workers reduces the probability to ﬁnd
a job.
The literature relating to LM is quite wide, but this topic is worth of a
lot of future studies for its importance and uncertainty of eﬀectiveness.
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Data used in our analysis
5.1 Sources
In this study we use administrative data. The database is obtained by the
linkage between two administrative archives: Giove (that is an archive from
the Labour Exchange Oﬃce) and INPS (that is an archive from social security
administration) [Maurizio and Trevisan, 2009].
The advantages to use administrative data are in term of cost, coverage
and timeliness:
• there is a reduction of costs, because data-gathering takes place for
other purposes and it is not sponsored and organized by statistical
data collectors.
• Usually there is a total coverage, thus data are more detailed than in
surveys on samples.
• The gathering of statistical data is continuous, thus it is possible to
obtain data with timeliness.
Nevertheless there are also some limitations in using administrative data.
In fact these databases are constructed for purposes diﬀerent from the statis-
tical analyses. There could be variables not collected, because considered not
interesting for administrative purposes. Some administrative variables could
have diﬀerent deﬁnitions than those utilized in statistic and the population
registered in administrative data could be diﬀerent from the population of
interest for statistical analyses.
315.1.1 Giove database
Giove is a statistical database composed by data coming from Labour Ex-
change Oﬃces (centri per l’impiego) [Maurizio, 2006].
Data collected by Labour Exchange Oﬃces come from:
• ﬁrms: they are committed by law to communicate information concern-
ing working histories (hiring, contracts and dismissal). These are the
biggest component of the dataset.
• workers: when they are looking for a job and they spontaneously go to
employment exchange oﬃces.
The database is composed by four tables, concerning workers, ﬁrms, agen-
cies and working histories. In particular we utilize data about:
• workers: gender, citizenship, age and educational qualiﬁcation
• working histories: the date of beginning and cessation of working spells,
kind of contract, qualiﬁcation and position.
5.1.2 Inps database
The other database used in order to obtain more information is composed
by data coming from the archive of social security administration (Inps). In
this database we have data about ﬁrms and more detailed information about
working histories. In fact there are data about all the employment spell
between employers and employees (with the dates of beginning and cessation
of every work and contract), qualiﬁcation, salary, position, kind of contracts
for every spell. In particular we have data about the salary received by each
worker during each working spell. For a smaller sample, composed only by
workers enrolled in LM during 1997 and 1998, we have also the salary after
three years from the entrance in LM.
5.1.3 Linkage
Although these two databases are composed by administrative data, there
are some diﬀerences caused by the way and the purposes of data-gathering.
In the ﬁrst dataset we have more personal information about workers; instead
in the second one we have more information about working spells and about
the salaries.
The linkage is obtained using a key for workers and one for employers.
With record linkage we lose some observations, but we gain in term of amount
of variables.
32with beneﬁt without beneﬁt
men women men women
total 8266 9825 7766 17832
percentage 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.41
Table 5.1: Summary statistics
5.2 Our sample
We carry out analyses on dismissed workers enrolled in LM in the Veneto
region from 1997 to 2003. Veneto is a well-developed region with an unem-
ployment rate lower than the Italian average. During 2003 the unemployment
rate for workers between 15 and 64 years old was 3,4% compared to the 8,8%
in Italy [Oecd, 2010]. Thus our main results could be generalized to most of
Northern and Central Italian regions, with similar unemployment rate; but
they can not be taken as representative of whole Italy. Furthermore in the
South of Italy the programme is diﬀerent in length. We use data from 1997 to
2006 in order to observe working histories over three years from the entrance
(years 1997-2003) in the LM programme.
We consider only workers younger than 50, because for older workers the
situation is more complicated, indeed sometimes they exploit an adding pro-
gramme called long mobility, that is a bridge to retirement. From the linkage
between the two databases we obtain a dataset with 43689 individuals. In
the dataset we can follow working history for each enrolled in list up to three
years. With the linkage we obtain information concerning:
• social demographic features: age, gender, education and citizenship
• past working history: length, position, qualiﬁcation and weekly wage
of the job which caused the mobility.
• LM with new working histories: year of start of the programme, if the
worker receives beneﬁts or not (it depends if the worker belonged to a
small or a big ﬁrm), days of unemployment up to a ﬁrst job and to a
permanent one, kind and supposed length of the ﬁrst contract and (for
a smaller sample) wage after three years from the entrance in LM
In table 5.1 we observe that most of our sample is composed by women
without beneﬁts. It means that a lot of women took advantage of the change
of the programme LM of 1993. With this change also workers belonged to
ﬁrms with less than 15 employees could be enrolled in LM, enjoying only the
active component.
33with beneﬁt without beneﬁt
men women men women
Age % <40 0.61 0.7 0.7 0.8
40-49 0.39 0.3 0.3 0.2
Citizenship % Italian 0.91 0.97 0.88 0.97
foreign 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.03
Destination of permanent 0.54 0.39 0.57 0.43
the ﬁrst job % temporary 0.34 0.39 0.33 0.37
no job in 3 years 0.12 0.22 0.10 0.20
Educational middle school 0.73 0.73 0.63 0.68
qualiﬁcation high school 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.29
(up to)% degree 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Table 5.2: Summary statistics
with beneﬁt without beneﬁt
age men women men women
<40 872 1041 1023 2278
40 - 49 529 301 437 367
total 1401 1342 1460 2645
Table 5.3: Summary statistics of the reduced sample
Looking at table 5.2 we observe that there are more young than old work-
ers, most of workers are Italian and with up to 8 years of education. Looking
at the percentage of workers who do not ﬁnd a job during three years from the
beginning of the LM, we ﬁgure out that the percentage is almost the same
for workers with and without beneﬁts (a little bigger for workers without
beneﬁts) and it is around 10% for men and 20% for women.
In order to analyse eﬀects of beneﬁts on wages we can use a smaller sam-
ple. We have data about wage of the previous job and after three years for a
sample of workers enrolled during 1997 and 1998. This sample is composed
by 8548 unemployed. If we restrict the sample to workers who ﬁnd a per-
manent job during these three years we obtain 6848 observations. Table 5.3
reports the composition of the sample by sex age and entitlement to income
support.
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Exploratory analyses
In this chapter we describe through exploratory analyses the main data char-
acteristics.
6.1 General trends depending on the contract
In the following four graphs we can see the probability to ﬁnd a job during
two years from the beginning of stay in LM, according to 4 types of contract:
• permanent;
• temporary contract switched later into a permanent one;
• temporary long (if the expected length of contract is more than 6
months);
• temporary short (if the expected length of contract is between 0 and 6
months).
These graphs are divided by age (younger and older than 40 years old) and
by beneﬁts (workers who enjoy beneﬁts or not). They have time (in months)
in abscissa and the probability to ﬁnd a job in ordinate.
The probability of re-employment during the t month (rt) is computed as
follows:
Pr(rt) =
# of unemployed who ﬁnd a job during t month
mean between # of unemployed at t and at t+1 month
Figure 6.1 shows the probability to ﬁnd a job for workers younger than
40 years old, who receive beneﬁt. During the ﬁrst month it is higher, then
35Fig. 6.1: Probability to ﬁnd a job for workers, who receive beneﬁts, younger
than 40 years old.
Fig. 6.2: Probability to ﬁnd a job for workers younger than 40 years old, who
do not receive beneﬁt.
36it decreases quickly and after some months it becomes almost constant. We
can notice a little spike at one year, when workers stop to receive the bonus.
Figure 6.2 shows the probability to ﬁnd a job for workers younger than 40
years old, who do not receive beneﬁt. This group has a similar trend of the
previous one, but here the probability to ﬁnd a job decreases slower during
the ﬁrst year. At the end of the ﬁrst year there is a little spike and after the
trend is almost constant. This group of workers do not receive beneﬁts, but
the ﬁrms have some incentives to hire them during the ﬁrst year.
The spike in correspondence of the last month of the mobility, followed
by a valley on the thirteenth month, could be attributed to the active part
of the programme (the incentive for ﬁrms). In fact an employer hiring a
worker up to the twelfth month takes advantage of cut in SSC, which is an
important saving in labour cost. Thus he is more interested in hiring workers
on the twelfth than on the thirteenth month. However the bigger spike seen
in ﬁgure 6.1 could be attributed to the mix of active component (incentives
for ﬁrms) and passive component (incentives for workers).
Focusing on the kind of contract, we notice that at the beginning there
are more unemployed who ﬁnd a job with a permanent contract (or with a
temporary contract switched later in a permanent one) than unemployed who
ﬁnd a job with a temporary short contract. After some months the trend of
all four kinds of contracts is almost the same.
Fig. 6.3: Probability to ﬁnd a job for workers older than 40 years old, who
receive beneﬁt.
37Fig. 6.4: Probability to ﬁnd a job for workers older than 40 years old, who
do not receive beneﬁt.
Figure 6.3 shows the situation for workers older than 40 years old, who
receive beneﬁts. After some months the probability to ﬁnd a job decreases
quickly and then it is quite small until the end of the stay in LM. The
probability to ﬁnd a job increases at the end of the second year, when the
unemployed exit from the LM.
Figure 6.4 shows the probability of re-employment for people older than
40 years old, who do not receive beneﬁts. This group has a trend similar to
that of younger workers who do not receive the bonus.
For older workers, we observe that at the end of the second year (when
the programme for unemployed is almost ﬁnished), there is a little increase
in re-employment. This growth is smaller for workers who do not receive
beneﬁts.
In all these four graphs we observe that during the ﬁrst ﬁve months,
the line representing temporary contract switched into permanent one is the
highest. This is the best strategy for ﬁrms, because with this type of contract
they enjoy up to 2 years of cut in SSC.
6.2 Survival analyses
Survival analysis is used to estimate the probability to leave the LM and
unemployment. For workers we have data on the ﬁrst three years from the
38dismissal; indeed we have to face the problem of right censoring, because not
all workers ﬁnd a job during that period.
In order to handle the right censoring problem we could use survival anal-
ysis. The survival function can be estimated by the Kaplan-Meier estimator,
which can be interpreted as joint probability of surviving to time t, where
surviving means remaining unemployed.
The Kaplan Meier estimator is deﬁned by
S(t) =
Y
j|tj≤t
rj − dj
rj
where:
rj is the number of spell at risk at time tj. In this analysis it is the number
of unemployed at time tj
dj is the number of spells ending at time tj. In this analysis it is the number
of unemployed who ﬁnd a job at time tj
6.2.1 Survival analysis up to the ﬁrst job
In this section we study the unemployment duration up to the ﬁrst job.
Actually if a worker ﬁnds a temporary job, he will temporarily leave the LM
up to the end of the contract; instead if he ﬁnds a permanent job, he will
deﬁnitively leave the LM.
Using the Kaplan Meier estimator we check the main eﬀects of some
variables. We start with the variable most interesting for our analysis, which
is the variable beneﬁt.
Figure 6.5 has in abscissa the time in days and in ordinate the probability
of staying in LM. Vertical lines show the end of the ﬁrst and of the second
year. The solid line represents workers who receive beneﬁts, the dashed line
the others.
From the graph we ﬁnd out that at the beginning the variable beneﬁt has
a positive eﬀect on re-employment, but after some months this eﬀect becomes
negative. During the second year the negative eﬀect decreases and during
the third year it is almost null. However the diﬀerence between the two lines
is not caused only by the presence of beneﬁts, because the two groups are
not randomly selected; workers with beneﬁt belonged to large ﬁrms, while
workers without beneﬁt belonged to smaller ﬁrms.
Now we separate the eﬀect of the same variable beneﬁt on four diﬀerent
groups. We want to check if the impact of a monetary aid is diﬀerent when we
divide the population in four groups according to gender and age (younger
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Fig. 6.5: Probability to stay unemployed, during the ﬁrst three years, by
beneﬁt.
or older than 40 years old). For these groups, we observe what happens
during the ﬁrst three years from the entrance in the list. We remind that
permanence in list of workers younger than 40 years lasts up to one year,
while the permanence of workers older than 40 years lasts up to two years.
Figure 6.6 shows the probability of surviving (staying unemployed) for
women below the threshold of 40 years old. During the ﬁrst three months
it is almost the same (a little higher for those who do not receive beneﬁts),
instead later it is higher for those who receive beneﬁt. During the second and
the third year, when beneﬁts for unemployment are ﬁnished, the diﬀerence is
smaller. Probably ﬁrms prefer to hire unemployed workers at the beginning
of the LM because incentives are higher. After the ﬁrst year workers who
received beneﬁts have more motivation to look for a job, because they do
not receive money anymore; thus during the second and the third year the
diﬀerence between the two groups decreases.
In ﬁgure 6.7 (men younger than 40 years old) we observe that for men
the distribution has a similar trend of the previous one, but the diﬀerences
between workers with and without beneﬁts are smaller. In general the prob-
ability to remain unemployed is higher for women.
In ﬁgure 6.8 we ﬁnd out that the probability to ﬁnd a job for women
older than 40 years old is very low and here the diﬀerence, between those
who receive beneﬁts and those who do not, is higher than in the previous
graphs. The group receiving beneﬁts seems to have a real negative impact
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Fig. 6.6: Probability to stay unemployed, during the ﬁrst three years for
women younger than 40, by beneﬁt.
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Fig. 6.7: Probability to stay unemployed, during the ﬁrst three years for men
younger than 40, by beneﬁt.
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Fig. 6.8: Probability to stay unemployed, during the ﬁrst three years for
women older than 40, by beneﬁt.
on the probability to ﬁnd a new job. We observe that the negative impact
decreases after the end of the second year, when workers are no longer in
LM.
In ﬁgure 6.9 we observe that for men over 40, receiving beneﬁts has a
negative impact after about three months. But here the diﬀerences between
the two distributions are smaller than for women. Also for this group the
negative impact becomes a little smaller after the second year.
From these four graphs we can conclude that ﬁnding a new job is more
diﬃcult for women and for older unemployed. Moreover for these groups
the entitlement to beneﬁt has a bigger negative impact on the probability of
re-employment.
Now we analyse the eﬀect of the variable education on the probability of
re-employment. We divide the number of years of education in three groups:
• middle school : where we consider workers who studied at most for 8
years
• high school: where we consider who studied between 9 and 13 years
• degree: where we consider graduated workers
Figure 6.10 shows that the probability to ﬁnd a new job is the highest
for workers with a number of years of education between 9 and 13 and it is
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Fig. 6.9: Probability to stay unemployed, during the ﬁrst three years for men
older than 40, by beneﬁt.
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Fig. 6.10: Probability to stay unemployed, during the ﬁrst three years, by
education.
43the lowest for workers with a degree. May be that graduated workers spend
more time to look for a job, because they have an higher reservation wage.
Then we analyse the eﬀect of another variable: the inﬂuence of the type
of previous work on the probability of staying in LM. We divide the type of
previous job in two groups:
• White collar workers are usually salaried professionals who do a job,
which is expectedly less strenuous but typically more highly paid than
that of blue-collar workers. With white collar workers we indicate:
highly specialized intellectual professions, intermediate technical occu-
pations, administrative executive professions, jobs of sales and family
services.
• Blue collar workers refer to manual or technical labourers, such as in
a factory or in technical maintenance trades. They may be skilled or
unskilled. With blue collar workers we include: artisans, skilled and
unskilled workers and unqualiﬁed personnel.
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Fig. 6.11: Probability to stay unemployed, during the ﬁrst three years, by
kind of previous work position.
In ﬁgure 6.11 we do not observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences between two groups.
The type of the previous job does not seem to inﬂuence the probability of
re-employment.
In ﬁgure 6.12 we observe the probability of re-employment considering the
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Fig. 6.12: Probability to stay unemployed, during the ﬁrst three years, by
salary.
variable salary of the previous job1. This variable is divided in four categories,
using quartiles of the distribution. From this analysis we notice that workers
with a lower previous wage have a lower probability of re-employment. This
probability of re-employment increases with the growth of the previous wage
and it is the same for workers with middle-high and high wages. Maybe
these two groups receive the same amount of bonus because of the ceiling of
maximum beneﬁts. Looking at this ﬁgure we ﬁnd out that workers with a
previous job with a medium or a higher wage have a bigger probability to
ﬁnd a job than workers with a lower wage. We guess that this behaviour
can depend both on ﬁrms, which might prefer workers with a bigger previous
wage (since they are more experienced and qualiﬁed) and on workers who
may have bigger necessity of income since their higher standard of living or
family needs.
6.2.2 Survival analysis to a permanent job
In this section we use survival analysis in order to estimate the probability to
stay in LM, where the failure is considered ﬁnding a permanent job, therefore
deﬁnitively leaving the LM. In these estimates dj (the number of spells ending
at time tj) is the number of unemployed who ﬁnd a permanent job at time tj.
1This variable is a proxy of the wage of the job, which caused the enrolment to the
LM. Actually it is the wage earned one year before the entrance in LM.
45This analysis could be useful to observe the eﬀect of LM, because the main
aim of this programme is to assist people to ﬁnd a permanent job. We could
achieve diﬀerent results because workers who do not receive beneﬁts may be
more interested in ﬁnding a job (even if temporary) than workers who receive
beneﬁts. In fact workers without beneﬁts have to sustain their income, while
workers with beneﬁts can aﬀord to refuse some job oﬀers because they are
waiting for a permanent job.
First of all we analyse the eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt (ﬁgure 6.13). We
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Fig. 6.13: Survival analysis (where the failure is to ﬁnd a job with a perma-
nent contract), during the ﬁrst three years, by beneﬁt.
observe that the probability to ﬁnd a permanent job is fast-growing at the end
of the ﬁrst year. This trend could be explained by the active component of the
programme. In fact employers ﬁnd proﬁtable to hire workers during the ﬁrst
month of LM with a temporary contract and after one year to switch it into
a permanent one. With this strategy they will enjoy up to two years of cut in
social security contributions. Looking at the eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt we
observe that after the ﬁrst month the probability to ﬁnd a permanent job is
bigger for workers without beneﬁts, during the second year this diﬀerence is
smaller and at the end of the third year it is almost null. Diﬀerences between
the two groups are similar to diﬀerences achieved in ﬁgure 6.5.
Now we separate the eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on four groups divided
by gender and age. We observe survival estimates for women (ﬁgure 6.14)
46and men (ﬁgure 6.15) younger than 40 years old and survival estimates for
women (ﬁgure 6.16) and men (ﬁgure 6.17) older than 40 years old.
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Fig. 6.14: Survival analysis (where the failure is to ﬁnd a job with a perma-
nent contract), for women younger than 40 years old, during the ﬁrst three
years, by beneﬁt.
First of all we observe that the variable beneﬁt has a small positive eﬀect
for men aged up to 40, during the third year. We remember that for this group
the programme lasts up to one year (ﬁrst vertical line), but it could lasts
longer if workers experience temporary job. During the third year workers
who receive beneﬁts have a slightly higher probability to ﬁnd a permanent
job than workers who do not receive them. It means that there are some
small positive eﬀects of the programme after about one year from the end of
LM.
Comparing the four graphs we notice that diﬀerences between receiving
or not receiving beneﬁts are smaller for workers aged up to 40 than for older
workers. The entitlement to income support has a negative eﬀect on the prob-
ability of a permanent re-employment especially for older workers. Younger
workers has a bigger probability to ﬁnd a permanent job than older work-
ers, probably because they are more attractive on the labour market and for
the possible eﬀect caused by diﬀerent length of the programme between two
groups.
Now we want to check if the programme has positive eﬀects on some sub-
groups. For this reason we consider only younger workers. In particular we
want to understand if the programme has a positive eﬀect on the probability
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Fig. 6.15: Survival analysis (where the failure is to ﬁnd a job with a per-
manent contract), for men younger than 40 years old, during the ﬁrst three
years, by beneﬁt.
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Fig. 6.16: Survival analysis (where the failure is to ﬁnd a job with a per-
manent contract), for women older than 40 years old, during the ﬁrst three
years, by beneﬁt.
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Fig. 6.17: Survival analysis (where the failure is to ﬁnd a job with a perma-
nent contract), for men older than 40 years old, during the ﬁrst three years,
by beneﬁt.
of permanent re-employment for workers with bigger expectations. We focus
on two groups of younger workers: white collar and workers with degree.
We suppose that these sub-groups have bigger expectations from the labour
market and probably a bigger reservation wage. We want to analyse if the
entitlement to income support is an incentive to wait for a better job (in this
case a permanent job), thus if workers who receive beneﬁts ﬁnd a permanent
job before than workers who do not.
In ﬁgure 6.18 we observe the probability to ﬁnd a permanent job for
younger white-collar workers. This probability is bigger for workers who
receive beneﬁts during all the three years, in particular from the end of the
ﬁrst year. For this subgroup the programme has a positive impact.
In ﬁgure 6.19 we observe that workers with degree have a higher prob-
ability to ﬁnd a permanent job in presence of beneﬁts. For this group the
programme has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀects during all three years.
6.3 Conclusions
From the exploratory analysis we can conclude these main eﬀects:
• The variable beneﬁt seems to have a negative eﬀect on the probability of
re-employment after the ﬁrst month. This eﬀect is smaller for younger
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Fig. 6.18: Survival analysis (where the failure is to ﬁnd a job with a per-
manent contract), for workers younger than 40 years old and white collar,
during the ﬁrst three years, by beneﬁt.
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Fig. 6.19: Survival analysis (where the failure is to ﬁnd a job with a perma-
nent contract), for workers younger than 40 years old with degree, during the
ﬁrst three years, by beneﬁt.
50workers and men and it is bigger for older workers and women. In
general women and older workers ﬁnd more diﬃcult to come back in
the labour market. This is in line with previous studies.
• The variable education seems to have quite a positive eﬀect: with more
years of education it is easier to ﬁnd a new job, but not for workers
with degree where the situation is quite opposite.
• The position of the previous job (if the worker was a white or a blue
collar) seems not to inﬂuence the unemployment duration.
Looking at the exploratory analysis on the probability to ﬁnd a permanent
job, we could say that beneﬁts help in particular more attractive unemployed
on the labour market. The bonus has a positive (or more exactly not nega-
tive) eﬀect on younger workers. We found also a positive eﬀect of the beneﬁt
on workers with a previous job with a higher qualiﬁcation and on workers
with degree. Comparing the trend of survival analysis to the ﬁrst job and to
a permanent one, we ﬁnd that many workers are hired during the ﬁrst month
with a temporary contract, which is switched later in a permanent one. This
is the best strategy for ﬁrms, in order to enjoy more months of cut in SSC.
5152Chapter 7
Empirical analyses
In this chapter we estimate a logit model in order to have a general idea of
the eﬀect of selected variables on the re-employment probability. In particu-
lar we focus on the eﬀect of the variable beneﬁts, in order to observe how
diﬀerent incentives inﬂuence the unemployment duration. Then we focus on
a subgroup of workers aged between 38 and 41, in order to better understand
what happens near the threshold of 40 years old. We conclude with a short
analysis of quality of re-employment, considering wages.
7.1 Logit model
In this section we estimate a model in order to evaluate the eﬀect of some
variables on the re-employment probability. In this model the response is
a binary variable, which takes two possible values representing success and
failure. We could deﬁne the response:
yi =
(
1 if the worker ﬁnd a job within the i-th month
0 otherwise
The response yi can take the value 1 with probability pi. These probabilities
pi depend on a vector of observed covariates xi. The simplest idea would be
to let pi be a linear function of the covariates:
pi = x
′
iβ
where β is the vector of regression coeﬃcients. One problem with this model
is that the probability pi should be between 0 and 1, but this linear predictor
does not guarantee that this condition will be satisﬁed. A solution is to
transform the model through two steps, obtaining in this way the logit model.
53In the logit model we have:
Pr(yi = 1|xi) =
exp(xiβ)
1 + exp(xiβ)
(7.1)
The marginal eﬀects of changes in the j-th component of xi are computed
in this way:
∂Pr(yi = 1|xi)
∂xij
=
exp(xiβ)
1 + exp(xiβ)
∗
 
1 −
exp(xiβ)
1 + exp(xiβ)
!
∗ βj (7.2)
We apply this model to two diﬀerent responses:
• the probability of ﬁrst re-employment, where we analyse the probability
to ﬁnd the ﬁrst job from the entrance in LM. In the ﬁrst job are included
also jobs with temporary contract.
• The probability of permanent re-employment.
We are interested in particular on the probability of permanent re-employment,
because it is the main purpose of the programme. However it is interesting
to study the probability of ﬁnding the ﬁrst job because only looking at this
probability we exactly know if unemployed are in LM. In fact when we com-
pute the probability of ﬁrst re-employment we know that, at the end of the
ﬁrst and of the second year, younger and older unemployed exit from the
LM. Instead looking at the probability of permanent re-employment we only
know the spell from the entrance in LM, but we do not control if during the
stay in LM workers have experienced temporary jobs, which cause the LM
duration temporary frozen.
7.1.1 Logit model on the probability of ﬁrst reemploy-
ment
In tables 7.1 and 7.2 we report the cumulative marginal eﬀects of changes
in some variables on the probability of ﬁnding a job during some months of
the ﬁrst year in LM. They are cumulative eﬀects because the response is the
probability to ﬁnd a job from the entrance in list up to the ﬁrst, third, sixth
and twelfth month. They are computed separated by gender: men (table
7.1) and women (table 7.2).
The most interesting variable that could have some eﬀect is the variable
beneﬁt. This variable acts in a double way:
• it is an incentive for employers who hire workers who enjoy beneﬁt
(active part of the programme).
54Table 7.1: Logit model for men (ﬁrst job)
Variables Months
(reference variable) 1 3 6 12
Beneﬁt (without) 0.032 *** -0.029 *** -0.055 *** -0.064 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
AGE (< 40 ) 0.348 *** 0.174 *** 0.149 0.132 *
(0.123) (0.009) (0.098) (0.077)
Age, if < 40 -0.002 ** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.003 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age, if 40-49 -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.008 *** -0.006 ***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Citizenship (Italian) -0.063 *** -0.079 *** -0.049 *** -0.015
(0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015)
Education (8 years)
High school -0.023 ** -0.040 *** -0.025 ** -0.009
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
Degree -0.056 ** -0.092 *** -0.090 *** -0.107 ***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029)
Wage (low)
medium low 0.140 *** 0.132 *** 0.088 *** 0.079 ***
(0.027) (0.019) (0.015) (0.011)
medium high 0.213 *** 0.228 *** 0.173 *** 0.127 ***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.015) (0.012)
high 0.228 *** 0.224 *** 0.156 *** 0.112 ***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.015) (0.012)
Previous job (Blue collar) -0.046 *** -0.058 *** -0.051 *** -0.039 ***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
Signiﬁcance levels are indicated with asterisks (* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are
in brackets
55Table 7.2: Logit model for women (ﬁrst job)
Variables Months
(reference variable) 1 3 6 12
Beneﬁt (without) -0.004 -0.005 *** -0.096 *** -0.110 ***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
AGE (< 40 ) 0.065 -0.138 -0.131 -0.092
(0.109) (0.107) (0.116) (0.110)
Age, if < 40 -0.005 *** -0.012 *** -0.014 *** -0.011 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age, if 40-49 -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.009 *** -0.008 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Citizenship (Italian) -0.008 -0.023 -0.023 -0.037
(0.020) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025)
Education (8 years)
High school 0.019 *** 0.012 0.028 *** 0.036 ***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Degree -0.003 -0.028 -0.032 -0.067 ***
(0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Wage (low)
medium low 0.063 *** 0.141 *** 0.149 *** 0.136 ***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
medium high 0.105 *** 0.176 *** 0.172 *** 0.144 ***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
high 0.080 *** 0.156 *** 0.162 *** 0.148 ***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Previous job (Blue collar) -0.014 ** -0.032 *** -0.024 *** -0.015 *
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Signiﬁcance levels are indicated with asterisks (* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are
in brackets
56• It is an income for workers who enjoy it, during the stay in LM (passive
part of the programme).
The estimates from the models conﬁrm the eﬀects observed in the previous
chapter. The variable beneﬁt has a positive eﬀect on the probability to ﬁnd
a new job only during the ﬁrst month. This eﬀect is positive and signiﬁcant
only for men, instead for women it is not signiﬁcant. After the ﬁrst month
this eﬀect becomes negative and this cumulative negative eﬀect increases
during all the ﬁrst year. In section 7.2.1 we will see more in detail the eﬀect
of this variable during three years from the entrance in LM.
The dummy variable AGE indicates what happens at the threshold of 40
years old. It could explain some eﬀects of the programme, because the policy
is diﬀerent for the groups below and above this threshold. The diﬀerence
is related to the maximum permanence in LM: respectively up to one and
up to two years. Thus with this variable we could analyse the eﬀect of
the additional year, because the eﬀect of age is already accounted for other
variables (Age, if < 40 and Age, if 40-49). The dummy variable AGE has a
positive cumulative eﬀect for men, but it is signiﬁcant only until the third
month. Instead for women it is not signiﬁcant. By the way we will better
analyse the eﬀect near the threshold in section 7.3.
The other variables of the model explain the eﬀect of some worker’s fea-
tures on the probability to ﬁnd a job. The variable age is computed sep-
arately for younger workers (Age, if < 40) and for older workers (Age, if
40-49). It has a negative signiﬁcant eﬀect both for men and for women, in
both categories. This negative eﬀect means that an increased wage makes
more diﬃcult to ﬁnd a job. This is why there are more incentives for older
workers: the programme tries to eliminate these diﬀerences caused by age.
The variable citizenship (not Italian citizen) has a negative eﬀect on the
probability to ﬁnd a job; this eﬀect is negative only for men.
Then we analyse the eﬀect of education. We divided the number of years
of education in three level: up to 8 years, up to the high school and degree.
For men more years of education have a negative eﬀect on the probability to
ﬁnd a job; for women the situation is diﬀerent. If they study more than 8
years, the probability to ﬁnd a job is higher than if they study less than 8
years; but if they have the degree this probability is smaller (it is signiﬁcant
only at the end of the ﬁrst year). Probably employers prefer to hire men
with less years of education, instead they prefer women who attended the
high school. This diﬀerence could be attribute to the type of job they are
looking for.
The variable previous job indicates if the worker was a blue or a white
collar workers. If the previous job was a more specialized one, then during the
57ﬁrst year it will be more diﬃcult to ﬁnd a job. Maybe it could be attribute to
the expectation of workers. If a worker had a more specialized job and he has
the opportunity to refuse the ﬁrst job oﬀers because he has an income from
the LM, then he will accept a job when he ﬁnd one with similar qualiﬁcation
than the previous.
7.1.2 Logit model on the probability of permanent re-
employment
Now we estimate the same model of 7.1.1 in order to analyse if there is a
diﬀerent eﬀect on the probability to ﬁnd a permanent job. We are interested
in this analysis because unemployed deﬁnitely exit from the list only when
they ﬁnd a permanent job.
The logit model estimates the probability to ﬁnd a permanent job for
men are in table 7.3. If we compare these results with those in table 7.1,
we observe similar eﬀects. In particular the variable beneﬁt has the same
negative eﬀect after the ﬁrst month. By the way we ﬁnd some diﬀerences:
• the variable age for workers aged up to 40 is not signiﬁcant
• the variable citizenship is not signiﬁcant
• the variables related to education (which divide the number of years of
education in three groups) are not signiﬁcant. In particular we observe
that the eﬀect of workers with degree is changed: in the previous anal-
ysis the degree had a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the probability to
ﬁnd a job; in this model it has a not signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the
probability to ﬁnd a permanent job (except at the end of the ﬁrst year
which becomes a not signiﬁcant but negative).
The logit model estimates for the probability to ﬁnd a permanent job
for women, are in table 7.4. If we compare these results with those in table
7.2, we observe similar eﬀects. In particular the variable beneﬁt has the
same signiﬁcant negative eﬀect after the ﬁrst month, but its eﬀect is slightly
smaller than in the previous analysis. Also the eﬀect of the variable age is
the same, but slightly smaller. The diﬀerences are:
• the variable citizenship is still signiﬁcant, but the eﬀect becomes posi-
tive
• the variables related to education are mostly not signiﬁcant. Also for
women the variable degree has a positive not signiﬁcant eﬀect (except
at the end of the ﬁrst year, that it becomes a not signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect)
58Table 7.3: Logit model for men (permanent job)
Variables Months
(reference variable) 1 3 6 12
Beneﬁt (without) 0.018 *** -0.019 *** -0.039 *** -0.060 ***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
AGE (< 40 ) 0.321 ** 0.296 ** 0.338 *** 0.230 *
(0.140) (0.130) (0.127) (0.127)
Age, if < 40 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age, if 40-49 -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.005 **
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Citizenship (Italian) -0.017 -0.014 0.006 0.026
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019)
Education (8 years)
High school -0.003 -0.011 -0.017 -0.024 **
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Degree 0.003 0.021 0.018 -0.013
(0.020) (0.026) (0.028) (0.031)
Wage (low)
medium low 0.062 *** 0.062 *** 0.047 *** 0.070 ***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023)
medium high 0.106 *** 0.109 *** 0.091 *** 0.106 ***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021)
high 0.118 *** 0.122 *** 0.099 *** 0.116 ***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Previous job (Blue collar) -0.164 ** -0.021 ** -0.019 * -0.038 ***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Signiﬁcance levels are indicated with asterisks (* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are
in brackets
59Table 7.4: Logit model for women (permanent job)
Variables Months
(reference variable) 1 3 6 12
Beneﬁt (without) -0.004 -0.032 *** -0.055 *** -0.073 ***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
AGE (< 40 ) 0.033 0.108 0.134 0.139
(0.071) (0.113) (0.119) (0.121)
Age, if < 40 -0.001 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Age, if 40-49 -0.001 -0.004 ** -0.004 ** -0.005 **
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Citizenship (Italian) 0.001 0.033 0.031 0.023
(0.012) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022)
Education (8 years)
High school 0.006 -0.001 -0.004 -0.012
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Degree 0.030 ** 0.017 0.008 -0.026
(0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020)
Wage (low)
medium low 0.017 *** 0.034 *** 0.043 *** 0.053 ***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.080)
medium high 0.024 *** 0.049 *** 0.059 *** 0.080 ***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
high 0.023 *** 0.048 *** 0.057 *** 0.074 ***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Previous job (Blue collar) 0.002 0.002 0.008 * 0.015 **
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Signiﬁcance levels are indicated with asterisks (* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are
in brackets
60• the kind of previous job (divided in white and blue collar) does not
inﬂuence the probability to ﬁnd a job.
7.2 Eﬀect of beneﬁts on ﬁrst reemployment
In this section we focus on the most interesting variable in order to under-
stand the eﬀect of incentives: the variable beneﬁt. On the basis of the same
models of the previous section, we estimate and put in a graph the cumulative
eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt for thirty-six months from the entrance in LM.
In the previous section analyses were carried out separately for two groups
(men and women), while here we use four groups, separately by gender (men
vs women) and age (younger vs older than 40 years old). We are mostly in-
terested in the eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on the probability of permanent
re-employment, but we start observing the eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on
the probability to ﬁnd a ﬁrst job, to understand workers behaviour during
the stay in LM. In fact in the ﬁrst two graphs we exactly know if workers are
still in LM (we do not have to handle previous temporary experiences, which
temporary freezes the duration of the programme).
Fig. 7.1: Cumulative eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on the probability to ﬁnd
a job, for men.
In ﬁgure 7.1 and in ﬁgure 7.2 we observe the cumulative eﬀect of the vari-
able beneﬁt respectively for men and women. The continuous line represents
61Fig. 7.2: Cumulative eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on the probability to ﬁnd
a job, for women.
signiﬁcant estimates and the dotted line the not signiﬁcant ones. Looking
at younger workers behaviour, we observe that during the ﬁrst two months
there is a positive eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on the probability of ﬁrst
re-employment for men, instead it is not signiﬁcant for women. Then the cu-
mulative eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt becomes signiﬁcantly negative and this
negative eﬀect increases up to the tenth month. From the eleventh month the
negative eﬀect starts to decrease and it almost disappears during the third
year (it is still negative for women, but with a small eﬀect; while it is not
signiﬁcant for men). This behaviour could be explained combining workers
and employers incentives. In ﬁgure 7.3 are summarized incentives for workers
to ﬁnd a job (on the left) and incentives for employers to hire a worker in
LM (on the right). Incentives for workers are computed assuming that they
ﬁnd a job with the same wage of the previous one; actually if they ﬁnd a
job with a bigger wage, incentives are bigger than those represented in the
graph. Instead if they ﬁnd a job with a smaller wage, incentives are smaller.
Moreover incentives of ﬁnding a new job will be larger for workers who had
a job with a bigger wage than the maximum ceiling, because staying in LM
allows them to receive less than 80% of the previous wage. As for employers,
they will receive bigger incentives hiring workers with beneﬁt only if they
hire them with a permanent contract.
Looking at ﬁgure 7.3 we can better understand the trend of the variable
62Fig. 7.3: Incentives hiring younger workers
beneﬁt for younger workers. The positive eﬀect during the ﬁrst month could
be explained by incentives for employers. In fact if two workers are looking
for the same job and the ﬁrst one receives beneﬁts instead the second one
does not, the employer will ﬁnd more convenient to hire the ﬁrst worker,
because (besides the cut in SSC) he will receive also half of the total bonus
of the worker. The negative trend of the variable beneﬁt during following
months could be explained considering also incentives for workers. During
the ﬁrst year, workers with beneﬁts staying in LM receive a bonus of 80%
of the previous wage. So if they ﬁnd a job during the ﬁrst year, the bonus
ﬁnishes and they receive a full wage. Indeed if the salary earned in the new
job is the same of the previous one, the incentive for this group of workers is
a surplus of 20% more of the wage. Instead if they ﬁnd a job after the ﬁrst
year, the incentive will be the full new wage. Maybe for this group during the
ﬁrst year it would be diﬃcult to accept a job with a lower salary than their
reservation wage; we will discuss with more in detail this point in section 7.4.
After the ﬁrst year incentives for employers and for workers with or with-
out beneﬁts are the same, thus the negative eﬀect accumulated during the
ﬁrst year starts to decrease and almost disappears after more than one year.
Fig. 7.4: Incentives hiring younger workers
63Now we analyse the behaviour of older workers. The cumulative eﬀect of
the variable beneﬁt on the probability to ﬁnd the ﬁrst job is negative and
it increases up to the ninth month for men and to the twelfth for women.
From the thirteenth month the cumulative negative eﬀect start to decrease,
in particular during the third year. Workers without beneﬁts older than 40
(but younger than 50) staying in LM receive 80% of the previous wage during
the ﬁrst year and 64% during the second one. So if they ﬁnd a job with the
same wage of the previous one, the surplus is
20% more if they ﬁnd it during the ﬁrst year,
36% more during the second year
100% more (the full wage) after the second year.
Looking at incentives both for employers and for workers (ﬁgure 7.4) we can
understand the trend of the graphs. The negative eﬀect caused by the passive
component is bigger for older workers, probably because for them the passive
component lasts two years. At the end of three years from the entrance in
LM there is still a negative eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt.
Both for men and for women we observe that the increasing trend at the
end of the ﬁrst year for younger workers is parallel with the trend at the end
of the second year for older workers, even if at diﬀerent levels. This eﬀect
could be explained by the diﬀerent duration of the programme (one year vs
two years). Comparing men with women we can see that the trend is similar,
but the negative eﬀect is bigger for women.
The variable beneﬁt has a double eﬀect:
• it anticipates the entrance in the labour market for a group of workers,
probably the most desirable workers for employers. This eﬀect is due
to the active part of the beneﬁt eﬀect, which encourage ﬁrms to hire
workers with beneﬁt, in order to enjoy more incentives;
• it postpones the entrance in the labour market for another group, prob-
ably because they take more time to look for a better job and they do
not accept jobs with a wage lower than their reservation wage.
This last point is worth to be analysed more in detail in the next section.
In particular we want to focus on the probability for workers in LM to ﬁnd
a permanent job.
647.2.1 Eﬀect of beneﬁts on a permanent reemployment
In this section we analyse the eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on the probability
to ﬁnd a permanent job. In fact we want to ﬁgure out if workers stay longer
in LM because they are waiting for a permanent job and so if the programme
has a good impact on the type of contract that workers ﬁnd during the ﬁrst
three years. Tables A.1 and A.2 (in appendix) show the cumulative eﬀects of
the variable beneﬁt for each month, respectively for men and women. These
eﬀects are represented in ﬁgures 7.5 and 7.6.
Fig. 7.5: Cumulative eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on the probability to ﬁnd
a permanent job, for men.
Comparing these graphs with the previous ones we observe a similar trend,
therefore previous comments for workers who ﬁnd a ﬁrst job apply also to
workers getting a permanent re-employment. Anyway the negative eﬀect is
smaller. May be that less workers, who receive beneﬁts, accept temporary
jobs, because they still receive an income, thus they can stay longer unem-
ployed waiting for a permanent job. A diﬀerence with previous graphs is a
positive slope at the end of the ﬁrst year in particular for men. Probably
at the beginning of the LM, ﬁrms hire a lot of workers with a temporary
contract and at the end of the ﬁrst year they switch it to a permanent one
in order to receive more months of cut in SSC. In fact we have seen that this
is the best strategy for ﬁrms. In this way employers could enjoy 24 months
of cut in SSC, that is the largest saving for ﬁrms from this programme. The
bigger positive eﬀect, for the ﬁrst job with respect to the permanent job,
could be due to this kind of switching contracts.
65Fig. 7.6: Cumulative eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on the probability to ﬁnd
a permanent job, for women.
7.3 Logit model near the threshold
In this section we want to estimate the logit model for workers near the
threshold of 40 years old, in order to remove diﬀerences caused by age. We
reduce the sample to workers aged between 38 and 41 years old, obtaining
two groups:
• workers aged 38-39, who could enjoy up to one year in LM
• workers aged 40-41, who could enjoy up to two years in LM
Thus we can focus on the eﬀect of beneﬁt according to the duration of pro-
gramme. In this way we have a control group in order to check the eﬀect
of a longer beneﬁt on re-employment probability. Therefore we introduce
the interaction between the variable AGE (dummy variable, equal to 1 if
the worker is older than 40 years old and to 0 if he is younger) and beneﬁt
(dummy variable, it is 1 if the worker receives the bonus). Through this
interaction we create two new dummy variables:
• beneﬁt*older: is the eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on older workers
• beneﬁt*younger: is the eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on younger workers
Introducing these two variables, we estimate the same models of section
7.1. These new models are estimated ﬁrst for the probability of ﬁrst re-
employment and then of the permanent one.
667.3.1 Logit model on the probability of ﬁrst reemploy-
ment, near the threshold
Firstly we estimate the cumulative eﬀect of changes in some variables on the
probability to ﬁnd a ﬁrst job during the two ﬁrst years from the entrance in
LM. We estimate it, ﬁrst for men (table 7.5) and then for women (table 7.6).
Looking at the interaction between the dummy variable AGE and beneﬁt
we observe the cumulative eﬀect of beneﬁts on younger and older men:
• For older workers the cumulative eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt is positive
only during the ﬁrst month, but it is not signiﬁcant. Then it starts to
decrease and it becomes signiﬁcantly negative during the second year.
• For younger workers during the ﬁrst year, there is a positive eﬀect of the
variable beneﬁt on the probability to ﬁnd a job. Afterwards it becomes
negative with the biggest impact at the end of the ﬁrst year. During
the second year, when workers do not receive beneﬁts, the negative
cumulative eﬀect starts to decrease. At the end of the second year
it is almost null. The eﬀect of beneﬁt for younger men is mostly not
signiﬁcant.
Looking at the cumulative eﬀect of this variable on women we observe:
• For women the eﬀect of beneﬁt is not signiﬁcant during the ﬁrst month.
Afterwards it becomes signiﬁcantly negative both for younger and older.
This negative eﬀect is bigger than for men.
• Looking at the trend of the variable beneﬁt we observe that for older
women, the bonus has a negative increasing eﬀect until the ﬁrst part
of the second year; then during the second half of the second year, the
cumulative negative eﬀect starts to decrease.
• For younger women the negative eﬀect increases until the end of the
ﬁrst year, then after the thirteenth month, the cumulative negative
eﬀect starts to decrease.
Looking at younger workers behaviour we ﬁnd that when workers stop to
receive a bonus, the bonus starts to have a positive eﬀect. Younger workers,
who receive a bonus equal to the 80% of the previous wage, probably during
the ﬁrst year are not so interested to look for a job and then when this income
ﬁnishes, they start to look for a job with more intensity. Even removing the
diﬀerences caused by age, beneﬁt has a bigger negative impact on older (40
- 41 years old) workers. This bigger negative impact could be attributed
67Table 7.5: Logit model for men between 38 and 41 years old (ﬁrst job)
Variables Months
(reference variable) 1 3 6 12 13 15 18 24
Beneﬁt (without)
younger * beneﬁt 0.068 * 0.010 -0.037 -0.054 * -0.049 * -0.021 -0.010 -0.001
(0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022)
older * beneﬁt 0.063 -0.056 -0.064 -0.067 * -0.077 ** -0.085 ** -0.074 ** -0.081 **
(0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.035)
AGE (< 40 ) 0.020 0.012 0.002 -0.011 -0.002 0.016 0.005 -0.027
(0.039) (0.021) (0.036) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025)
Citizenship (Italian) -0.162 *** -0.170 *** -0.103 ** -0.001 0.002 -0.012 -0.010 0.016
(0.040) (0.049) (0.049) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.029)
Education (8 years)
High school 0.005 -0.037 -0.024 0.013 0.012 0.008 -0.000 0.008
(0.034) (0.035) (0.032) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.020)
Degree -0.016 -0.082 -0.071 -0.019 -0.027 -0.044 -0.058 -0.045
(0.070) (0.074) (0.069) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.047)
Wage (low)
medium low 0.085 0.077 0.119 ** 0.082 ** 0.088 *** 0.087 *** 0.076 *** 0.075 ***
(0.084) (0.067) (0.047) (0.035) (0.033) (0.029) (0.026) (0.022)
medium high 0.126 * 0.118 * 0.172 *** 0.137 *** 0.137 *** 0.127 *** 0.133 *** 0.134 ***
(0.076) (0.064) (0.051) (0.040) (0.039) (0.036) (0.033) (0.030)
high 0.181 ** 0.141 ** 0.156 *** 0.091 ** 0.098 ** 0.096 ** 0.086 *** 0.084 ***
(0.075) (0.064) (0.052) (0.041) (0.040) (0.037) (0.033) (0.030)
Previous job (Blue collar) -0.115 *** -0.130 *** -0.108 *** -0.067 ** -0.065 ** -0.072 *** -0.064 *** -0.074 ***
(0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
Signiﬁcance levels are indicated with asterisks (* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are in brackets
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8Table 7.6: Logit model for women between 38 and 41 years old (ﬁrst job)
Variables Months
(reference variable) 1 3 6 12 13 15 18 24
Beneﬁt (without)
younger * beneﬁt -0.021 -0.082 *** -0.117 *** -0.133 *** -0.112 *** -0.098 *** -0.073 ** -0.055 *
(0.021) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028)
older * beneﬁt -0.009 -0.097 *** -0.129 *** -0.183 *** -0.177 *** -0.182 *** -0.169 *** -0.144 ***
(0.024) (0.031) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
AGE (< 40 ) -0.022 0.027 0.013 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 0.006
(0.021) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
Citizenship (Italian) 0.034 0.018 0.060 0.004 -0.013 -0.031 -0.003 -0.032
(0.055) (0.080) (0.083) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.075) (0.075)
Education (8 years)
High school 0.029 0.010 0.031 0.051 * -0.053 * -0.039 -0.076 -0.069
(0.023) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
Degree 0.048 0.103 0.011 -0.035 -0.053 -0.039 -0.076 -0.069
(0.074) (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.009) (0.092) (0.090)
Wage (low)
medium low 0.083 *** 0.150 *** 0.141 *** 0.174 *** 0.170 *** 0.166 *** 0.152 *** 0.137 ***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
medium high 0.152 *** 0.179 *** 0.180 *** 0.163 *** 0.152 *** 0.154 *** 0.140 *** 0.132 ***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020)
high 0.135 *** 0.213 *** 0.180 *** 0.198 *** 0.190 *** 0.190 *** 0.177 *** 0.158 ***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.032) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
Previous job (Blue collar) -0.034 * -0.082 *** -0.061 ** -0.062 ** -0.058 ** -0.064 *** -0.053 ** -0.046 *
(0.019) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
Signiﬁcance levels are indicated with asterisks (* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are in brackets
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9to the programme, which does not work as expected in term of spell of
unemployment up to the ﬁrst job, in particular during the second year from
the entrance in LM.
We are considering only workers between 38 and 41 years old, in order to
understand what happens near the threshold of 40 years. The dummy vari-
able AGE (that is 1 if workers are older than 40) is not signiﬁcant. It means
that if we consider workers with similar age, not considering the interaction
with beneﬁt, there are no diﬀerences between two groups (up or below the
threshold of 40 years old). The eﬀect of the variable AGE of the previous
model now disappears and it is caught by the interaction between beneﬁt
and AGE.
The variable citizenship (not Italians) has a negative signiﬁcant eﬀect
only for men during the ﬁrst year. Actually for women during the ﬁrst year
it has a positive eﬀect, but it is not signiﬁcant. During the second year it is
not signiﬁcant both for men and women.
Education does not inﬂuence this group on re-employment probability.
Instead the variable wage is signiﬁcant both for men and women. If they
had a medium-high or a high wage in the previous job, then they will have a
higher probability of re-employment.
From the variable related to the kind of previous job we ﬁgure out that
workers with higher qualiﬁcation will stay longer in LM.
7.3.2 Logit model on the probability of permanent re-
employment near the threshold of 40 years old
Now we compute the same model, but changing the variable response. We
analyse the probability to ﬁnd a permanent job, near the threshold of 40
years old. Tables 7.7 and 7.8 show the logit model respectively for men and
women. We observe the eﬀects of selected variables on the probability of
permanent re-employment for men and women.
Looking at the interaction between beneﬁt and younger workers, we ﬁnd
the eﬀect of the beneﬁt on workers aged 38 and 39. The variable beneﬁt has
a positive eﬀect during the ﬁrst month, but afterwards it becomes negative.
This eﬀect for men is signiﬁcantly negative during the second half of the
ﬁrst year, therefore during the stay in LM. For women the negative eﬀect
continues also during the second year.
Looking at the interaction between older workers and beneﬁt we ﬁnd that
from the end of the ﬁrst year, the variable beneﬁt starts to have a negative
eﬀect on the probability of permanent re-employment for workers aged 40
and 41. But we will see more in detail the eﬀect of beneﬁt for each month in
70Table 7.7: Logit model for men between 38 and 41 years old (permanent job)
Variables Months
(reference variable) 1 3 6 12 13 18 24 25 30
Beneﬁt (without)
younger * beneﬁt 0.005 * -0.035 -0.064 ** -0.066 ** -0.054 -0.057 * -0.042 -0.034 -0.014
(0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032) (0.030)
older * beneﬁt 0.041 -0.026 -0.054 -0.100 *** -0.115 *** -0.166 *** -0.139 *** -0.117 *** -0.095 **
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.037) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041)
AGE (< 40 ) -0.007 0.007 0.018 0.026 0.051 0.051 0.030 0.032 0.030
(0.027) (0.031) (0.034) 0.037 (0.039) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035)
Citizenship (Italian) -0.055 ** -0.041 *** 0.002 ** 0.059 0.001 0.046 0.022 0.009 0.031
(0.028) (0.037) (0.043) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.045) (0.045) (0.041
Education (8 years)
High school 0.013 0.002 -0.006 -0.023 -0.059 * -0.097 *** -0.046 -0.041 -0.006
(0.024) (0.029) (0.031) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032) (0.030)
Degree 0.017 0.034 0.000 -0.052 -0.122 * -0.141 * -0.127 * -0.136 * -0.151 **
(0.055) (0.067) (0.068) (0.070) (0.071) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072)
Wage (low)
medium low 0.056 0.043 0.052 0.076 0.141 * 0.183 *** 0.187 *** 0.176 *** 0.178 ***
(0.073) 0.070 (0.075) (0.076) (0.073) (0.056) (0.042) (0.041) (0.037)
medium high 0.064 * 0.069 * 0.118 * 0.161 ** 0.207 *** 0.259 *** 0.257 *** 0.245 *** 0.261 ***
(0.060) (0.062) (0.067) (0.069) (0.068) (0.058) (0.050) (0.049) (0.043)
high 0.060 0.061 0.108 0.138 ** 0.214 *** 0.231 *** 0.235 *** 0.226 *** 0.219 ***
(0.060) (0.062) (0.067) (0.069) (0.068) (0.060) (0.051) (0.050) (0.046)
Previous job (Blue collar) -0.041 ** -0.055 ** -0.068 ** -0.043 -0.067 ** -0.029 -0.055 * -0.062 ** -0.065 **
(0.020) (0.026) (0.027) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029)
Signiﬁcance levels are indicated with asterisks (* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are in brackets
7
1section 7.3.3.
The eﬀect of workers characteristics on the probability of permanent re-
employment is similar to those seen in the previous section, in particular
for men. For women we ﬁnd diﬀerences according to the previous job. The
negative eﬀect of being white collar workers on the probability of permanent
re-employment now is not signiﬁcant.
7.3.3 Eﬀect of beneﬁts on a permanent reemployment
near the threshold
We estimate the same model of the previous section, but we report only the
cumulative eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on men and women. Then we test
the diﬀerences between the two variables (eﬀect of beneﬁt for older workers
and eﬀect of beneﬁts for younger workers) in order to understand if they have
a signiﬁcant diﬀerent eﬀect. Figures 7.7 and 7.8 show the cumulative eﬀect
of the variable beneﬁt on the probability of permanent re-employment. We
observe a trend similar to the one seen in the previous graphs. In tables 7.9
and 7.10 we report the cumulative eﬀect for all 36 months and a test with its
corresponding p-value. The null hypothesis is that two coeﬃcients are equal
and thus that there is no diﬀerence on the eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on
workers below or above the threshold of 40 years old.
Fig. 7.7: Cumulative eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on the probability to ﬁnd
a permanent job, for men.
The test for women accepts the null hypothesis of equal eﬀect of beneﬁt on
younger vs. older workers, during all the three years. Regarding the test for
72Table 7.8: Logit model for women between 38 and 41 years old (permanent job)
Variables Months
(reference variable) 1 3 6 12 13 18 24 25 30
Beneﬁt (without)
younger * beneﬁt -0.014 -0.027 * -0.064 *** -0.082 *** -0.072 *** -0.074 *** -0.061 ** -0.060* -0.049
(0.011) (0.015) (0.017) 0.021 (0.024) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
older * beneﬁt 0.008 -0.034 ** -0.047 ** -0.107 *** -0.109 *** -0.121 *** -0.110 *** -0.104 *** -0.104 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.023) (0.026) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
AGE (< 40 ) 0.001 0.018 -0.007 0.001 0.006 -0.013 -0.051 * 0.053 * -0.035
(0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Citizenship (Italian) 0.014 0.064 0.028 0.061 0.005 -0.068 -0.078 -0.119
(0.048) (0.065) (0.070) (0.077) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
Education (8 years)
High school 0.021 0.003 -0.009 -0.014 -0.007 -0.060 ** -0.018 -0.019 -0.027
(0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Degree 0.017 0.034 0.000 -0.052 -0.122 * -0.141 * -0.127 * -0.136 * -0.069
(0.045) (0.051) (0.057) (0.073 (0.077) (0.085) (0.090) (0.092) (0.093)
Wage (low)
medium low 0.001 0.022 0.017 0.046 * 0.074 *** 0.123 *** 0.119 *** 0.124 *** 0.120 ***
(0.012) (0.018) (0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028 ) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026)
medium high 0.028 * 0.042 * 0.029 0.040 0.063 ** 0.127 *** 0.144 *** 0.157 *** 0.163 ***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.024 ) (0.028) (0.031 ) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
high 0.033 * 0.087 *** 0.076 *** 0.126 *** 0.146 *** 0.163 *** 0.176 *** 0.178 *** 0.157 ***
(0.019) (0.027) (0.028) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032)
Previous job (Blue collar) -0.009 -0.005 0.007 -0.009 -0.022 -0.011 -0.029 * -0.027 -0.007
(0.010) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
Signiﬁcance levels are indicated with asterisks (* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are in brackets
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3Table 7.9: Cumulative eﬀects of the variable beneﬁt on men (38-41 years old)
Variables Months
(reference vari-
able)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
younger 0.005 -0.017 -0.035 -0.058 ** -0.054 * -0.064 ** -0.090 *** -0.089 *** -0.089 ***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
older 0.041 -0.005 -0.026 -0.048 -0.039 -0.053 -0.048 -0.049 -0.066 *
(0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
test 0.84 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.82 0.71 0.23
0.360 0.764 0.833 0.816 0.742 0.830 0.367 0.398 0.632
Months
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
younger -0.096 *** -0.094 *** -0.066 ** -0.054 -0.063 * -0.069 ** -0.067 * -0.054 -0.057 *
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
older -0.064 * -0.082 *** -0.100 *** -0.115 *** -0.163 *** -0.174 *** -0.186 *** -0.176 *** -0.166 ***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
test 0.42 0.05 0.51 1.32 3.50 * 3.74 * 4.76 ** 4.99 ** 3.99 **
0.517 0.821 0.474 0.250 0.061 0.053 0.029 0.025 0.046
Months
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
younger -0.068 ** -0.050 -0.044 -0.045 -0.048 -0.042 -0.034 -0.032 -0.022
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
older -0.177 *** -0.167 *** 0.150 *** -0.134 *** -0.142 *** -0.139 *** -0.117 *** -0.113 *** -0.100 **
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041)
test 3.95 ** 4.58 ** 3.76 * 2.72 * 2.95 * 3.23 * 2.46 2.42 2.26
0.047 0.032 0.053 0.099 0.086 0.072 0.117 0.121 0.133
Months
28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
younger -0.023 -0.019 -0.012 -0.012 -0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
older -0.098 ** -0.094 ** -0.093 ** -0.104 ** -0.098 ** -0.088 ** -0.083 ** -0.077 * -0.074 *
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
test 2.08 2.16 2.64 3.34 * 3.33 * 2.65 2.75 2.34 1.96
0.150 0.140 0.104 0.067 0.068 0.104 0.097 0.126 0.161
Signiﬁcance levels are indicated with asterisks (* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are in brackets
7
4Table 7.10: Cumulative eﬀects of the variable beneﬁt on women (38-41 years old)
Variables Months
(reference var.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
younger -0.014 -0.027 ** -0.027 ** -0.046 *** -0.060 *** -0.064 *** -0.079 *** -0.075 *** -0.082 ***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
older 0.008 -0.023 * -0.034 ** -0.028 -0.034 * -0.047 ** -0.065 *** -0.068 *** -0.080 ***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
test 1.56 0.04 0.15 0.56 1.03 0.38 0.23 0.04 0.00
0.212 0.837 0.696 0.452 0.309 0.540 0.628 0.836 0.995
Months
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
younger -0.087 *** -0.086 *** -0.082 *** -0.072 *** -0.070 *** -0.082 *** -0.089 *** -0.078 *** -0.074 ***
(0.019 (0.019 (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
older -0.087 *** -0.095 *** -0.107 *** -0.109 *** -0.119 *** -0.141 *** -0.129 *** -0.124 *** -0.121 ***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032)
test 0.00 0.14 0.78 1.19 1.83 2.51 1.07 1.29 1.29
0.995 0.707 0.378 0.276 0.176 0.113 0.302 0.256 0.255
Months
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
younger -0.071 ** -0.068 ** -0.076 *** -0.075 *** -0.067 ** -0.061 ** -0.060 * -0.059 * -0.057 *
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029 ) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
older -0.117 *** -0.113 *** 0.116 *** -0.118 *** -0.121 *** -0.110 *** -0.104 *** -0.098 *** -0.101 ***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
test 1.23 1.11 0.88 0.97 1.51 1.25 0.95 0.73 0.94
0.267 0.291 0.348 0.324 0.219 0.263 0.329 0.393 0.332
Months
28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
younger -0.054 * -0.056 * -0.052 * -0.045 -0.052 * -0.049 -0.051 * -0.054 * -0.053 *
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
older -0.097 *** -0.110 *** -0.107 *** -0.107 *** -0.100 ** -0.101 *** -0.097 *** -0.098 *** -0.080 **
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
test 0.87 1.39 1.46 1.90 1.10 1.28 1.01 0.92 0.34
0.350 0.238 0.228 0.168 0.294 0.257 0.314 0.337 0.559
Signiﬁcance levels are indicated with asterisks (* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are in brackets
7
5Fig. 7.8: Cumulative eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on the probability to ﬁnd
a permanent job, for women.
men, if we choose a signiﬁcance level of 10%, we refuse the null hypothesis
during the second year and some months of the third year. If we choose
a signiﬁcance level of 5%, we refuse the null hypothesis from sixteenth to
twentieth month. This means that during these months the eﬀect of beneﬁt
on re-employment probability is negative and higher in magnitude for older
workers. Actually we do not know if workers younger than 40 years old are
still in LM, it depends if they had temporary job experiences. We could
attribute this diﬀerent impact to the additional year of the programme. We
can conclude that during the additional year the passive component of the
programme has a negative impact on the probability of re-employment for
older men. This negative eﬀect is not counteracted by the active component
of the programme. However during the third year the signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between two eﬀects almost disappear. Therefore the additional year has
no signiﬁcant negative eﬀect after three years from the entrance in LM. It
would be interesting to check if the negative impact during the programme
has positive eﬀects afterwards, in particular in term of quality of job.
7.4 Analyses of wages
In this chapter we observed the eﬀect of some variables (in particular of
beneﬁt) on the duration of unemployment. At this point it is worth to analyse
the eﬀect on the quality of re-employment. As quality of re-employment we
considered the type of contract (permanent contract). Now we introduce a
76new variable related to the quality of re-employment. In fact we have data
on wage after three years from the entrance in LM for workers who entered in
LM during 1997 and 1998. With exploratory analyses we try to understand
if beneﬁt has eﬀect on re-employment quality in term of increase or reduction
of worker’s wage.
First of all we compute a new variable as the fraction of new over previous
wage. This variable is bigger than 1 if there is a wage increase, instead it
is smaller than 1 if there is a wage reduction. Through survival analysis
we check, during three years from the entrance in LM, if workers exit from
unemployment with an increased or a reduced wage.
For these analyses we use a sample composed by workers enrolled in LM
during 1997 and 1998, who found a permanent job during three years from
the entrance in list. Figure 7.9 shows the survival analysis to a permanent
job, considering increased or reduced wage. We observe that at beginning
there are no diﬀerences between the probability to ﬁnd a job with a reduced
or an increased wage. From the end of the ﬁrst year the probability to ﬁnd
a permanent job with a reduced wage is slightly bigger.
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Fig. 7.9: Survival analysis, by new wage
Then we observe the survival analysis more in detail, we consider eight
sub-groups generated by gender, age and entitlement to income support.
In ﬁgure 7.10 (on the right) we observe the sub-group composed by men
younger than 40 years old, entitled to an income support. During the ﬁrst
year, there are more unemployed who ﬁnd permanent job with an increased
wage (compared to the previous job), than unemployed who ﬁnd a job with
770
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Fig. 7.10: Survival analyses, by new wage. Younger workers entitled to
income support, on the left women and on the right men
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Fig. 7.11: Survival analyses, by new wage. Younger workers not entitled to
income support, on the left women and on the right men
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Fig. 7.12: Survival analyses, by new wage. Older workers entitled to income
support, on the left women and on the right men
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Fig. 7.13: Survival analyses, by new wage. Older workers not entitled to
income support, on the left women and on the right men
a reduced wage. Comparing this group with younger men not entitled to
income support (ﬁgure 7.11 on the right), we observe that during all three
years there are more unemployed who ﬁnd a job with a reduced wage. It
means that during the stay in LM (ﬁrst year), workers with beneﬁt have a
positive eﬀect from the income support on the quality of job. Probably they
refuse job oﬀers with smaller wages. Nevertheless during the second year this
positive eﬀect disappears and workers start to ﬁnd more jobs with reduced
wage.
Looking at ﬁgures 7.10 and 7.11 on the left, we observe that during the
ﬁrst two years, younger women aged up to 40 not entitled to beneﬁt ﬁnd
more permanent job with a reduced wage, than those entitled to beneﬁt.
On the other hand, women older than 40 years old entitled to beneﬁt
(ﬁgures 7.12 and 7.13 on the left) have a remarkable bigger probability to
exit from unemployment with a reduced wage than older women not entitled
to beneﬁt, in particular during the second year.
The situation of older men is similar to the one seen for younger men.
During the ﬁrst year workers not entitled to income support have a bigger
probability to ﬁnd a job with a reduced wage.
We can suppose that the bigger probability to exit from unemployment
during the ﬁrst year for workers not entitled to beneﬁt, is due to the fact
that they accept more job oﬀers with reduced wage, than workers entitled
to beneﬁt (not for older women). Workers entitled to beneﬁt during their
permanence in LM have a bigger reservation wage, thus they refuse more job
oﬀers. After the ﬁrst year, this positive eﬀect on the new wage of receiving
beneﬁts disappears. Probably during the second and the third year, the
reservation wage of workers entitled to beneﬁts decreases, thus they start to
accept jobs with lower wages.
7980Chapter 8
Final conclusions
In this thesis we studied the eﬀect of the Italian programme Liste di mobilit` a
(LM) on unemployment duration. The complexity of the evaluation is due
to the fact that it is an universal programme, thus we do not have a control
group. The programme is diﬀerent in terms of duration and entitlement to
beneﬁts according to the workers characteristics. Hence, in order to handle
the problem caused by the programme universality, we obtain control groups
taking advantage of diﬀerent programme features, even if the workers enrolled
in LM are not randomly selected. As we saw before, this policy is interesting
because it combines both a passive component in order to sustain worker’s
income and an active component in order to assist workers to ﬁnd a new job:
• The largest part of the active component is enjoyed by all the workers
enrolled in LM. It is an incentive for ﬁrms to hire workers in LM, which
consists in cutting social security contributions. We do not focus on
this active component because its eﬀectiveness is diﬃcult to be assessed
as it is applied to all the workers of the sample. The other part of the
active component is enjoyed by employers who hire workers in LM.
They receive half of the remaining bonus, for one year at maximum.
This incentive decreases every month, thus ﬁrms ﬁnd convenient to hire
workers during the ﬁrsts month in LM.
• The passive component is enjoyed only by workers collectively ﬁred
from ﬁrms with more than 15 employees. This component is a bonus in
order to support workers’ income but, as we saw above, it can become
a beneﬁt transfer from worker to ﬁrm.
Looking at the analyses, in particular at the survival analyses, we sup-
pose that ﬁrms take advantage of the active component. In fact during the
ﬁrst month we ﬁnd a larger number of temporary contracts, switched in per-
manent ones probably at the end of the year. With this strategy, the ﬁrms
81obtain the largest amount of cut in SSC (up to 24 months). We can not as-
sert that this eﬀect is due to the programme, as this component is universal
(enjoyed by the whole sample).
Now we shortly see which kind of worker is more attractive or, more
exactly, has shorter unemployment duration. We observed that the more
attractive workers in the labour market are younger males. The probability
of re-employment is higher for younger than for older workers, although older
workers get more incentives. All these observations are in line with previous
studies.
Analysing the number of years of education, we notice that men with
less years of education (up to 8 years) have a bigger probability of ﬁnding
a job, while women unemployment duration is shorter if they attended the
high school. Anyway, the degree has a negative eﬀect on the probability
to ﬁnd the ﬁrst job both for men and women. Regarding the duration of
unemployment up to a permanent job, education is mostly not signiﬁcant.
Workers with a previous white collar job take more time to ﬁnd a new job,
but it could depend by their expectations (may be because they are looking
for a job with the same qualiﬁcation). The previous job has an higher eﬀect
on men than on women.
Looking at how previous wages inﬂuence the probability of re-employment,
we observe that workers with a lower previous wage have a smaller probability
of re-employment, while workers with higher wages have shorter unemploy-
ment duration. We guess that this behaviour can depend both on ﬁrms,
which might prefer workers with a higher previous wage (since they are more
experienced and qualiﬁed) and on workers who may have larger necessity of
income because of their higher standard of living or family needs. In fact
workers with higher wages will have a bigger loss of income when they loose
their job, even if they are entitled to income support. This is due to the
fact that income support can not exceed a ceiling, which changes every year,
hence the beneﬁt could be deﬁnitely lower than the 80% of the previous wage.
Considering the supposed big impact of the previous wage level, it could be
interesting to study the unemployment duration stratifying by previous wage
level.
Then we focused on the most interesting variable: beneﬁt. Through
exploratory analyses, we observed that beneﬁts do not seem to have a positive
eﬀect on the probability of ﬁnding a job, during the stay in LM (except at the
beginning). After three years from the entrance in LM, the diﬀerence between
who was or who was not entitled to beneﬁt is almost null for younger workers.
For older workers, in particular for women, we still observe a negative, even
if smaller, eﬀect of the income support.
82Then we estimated a logit model in order to check the eﬀect found with
the survival analysis. In particular we want to focus on the beneﬁt eﬀect
on unemployment duration. First of all we estimate a model concerning
unemployment duration up to the ﬁrst job, then up to a permanent job. The
ﬁrst model is interesting because we can observe workers behaviour, knowing
exactly if they are still in LM. The second one is interesting because the
programme aim is to assist workers to ﬁnd a permanent job. These analyses
are carried out on four diﬀerent groups, in order to eliminate diﬀerences
caused by gender or programme duration according to the workers age.
The eﬀect of the beneﬁt could be explained looking at incentives for em-
ployers, workers and their reservation wage. Looking at the trend of the
cumulative eﬀects of beneﬁt on younger workers we ﬁnd that:
• At the beginning of the ﬁrst year there is a bigger probability of re-
employment for workers entitled to beneﬁt. This eﬀect can be explained
by incentives for ﬁrms, which are larger if they hire workers with beneﬁt,
in particular during the ﬁrst month.
• Then during the ﬁrst year, there is a bigger probability of re-employment
for those without beneﬁt. This eﬀect is explained by incentives for
workers: workers not receiving an income support have a bigger incen-
tive to re-employment than those who receive the 80% of the previous
wage. Moreover workers with beneﬁt have a bigger reservation wage,
because it is positively correlated with the amount of beneﬁt and with
the probability of obtaining a bigger wage if they prolong the search
for a job. Therefore the workers who receive beneﬁts refuse more job
oﬀers, because below their reservation wage. Looking at the survival
analysis, during the ﬁrst year we ﬁnd more younger men entitled to
beneﬁt who ﬁnd a job with an increased wage than with a reduced
wage (comparing the wage of the new permanent job, with the wage of
the job which caused the enrolment to the programme). While the situ-
ation for younger men is opposite. Concerning women, we ﬁnd smaller
positive eﬀect of the entitlement to beneﬁt.
• During the second year all these eﬀects decrease. This reduction is
explained by incentives for workers and their decreasing reservation
wage because workers are not receiving a bonus anymore. Thus the
workers entitled to beneﬁt start to accept job oﬀers more frequently
(also if with smaller wages) and during the third year, the diﬀerences
between those who received beneﬁt and those who did not is almost null.
Actually we ﬁnd a positive not signiﬁcant eﬀect for men and a small
negative eﬀect for women. Also diﬀerences considering the increase or
83the wage reduction disappears; thus the positive eﬀect of the ﬁrst year
of the programme vanishes over time.
Looking at the trend of the cumulative eﬀect of beneﬁt on older workers,
we observe that it is similar for younger workers, but the negative eﬀect of
the income support is bigger:
• The positive eﬀect observed during the ﬁrst month for younger work-
ers, is almost null in the case of older workers. Employers prefer hiring
younger workers even if the incentives for hiring younger or older work-
ers are the same during the ﬁrst month.
• The negative eﬀect seen during the ﬁrst month, for older workers lasts
up to half of the second year (slightly less for men). During the second
year the incentive to ﬁnd a new job is smaller for older than younger
workers, because older workers still receive an income (even if smaller).
Looking at the eﬀect of receiving beneﬁt on the wage growth/reduction,
we observe similar results to those seen for younger workers. But this
is true only for men during the ﬁrst year, while the results are opposite
during the second year and for women.
• During the second half of the second year the negative eﬀect starts to
decrease, but it is still signiﬁcantly negative both for men and women
at the end of the third year from the entrance in LM.
Then we focused on the eﬀect of the additional year of the programme
on unemployment duration. We estimated a logit model on workers aged
between 38 and 41 years old. Comparing the eﬀect of the variable beneﬁt on
younger workers with older workers through a test, we ﬁnd that the additional
year has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect during the second year from the entrance
in LM, but this negative eﬀect disappears after three years from the entrance
in LM.
In conclusion we found the eﬀect of the beneﬁt on unemployment duration
over three years from the entrance in LM. The entitlement to beneﬁt:
• anticipates the entrance in the labour market, thanks to the active part
of the beneﬁt (as transfer from workers to employers). This eﬀect is
small and can be seen only during the ﬁrst month;
• delays the entrance in labour market; this is due to the passive compo-
nent of the beneﬁt (income for workers). Workers receiving an income
have a smaller incentive to ﬁnd a job. Moreover income increases their
reservation wage, thus they will accept less job oﬀers, even if the beneﬁt
might be useful for a better matching between job supply and demand.
84The eﬀectiveness of the programme is higher for workers more attractive for
the labour market (younger men) than for women and older workers. During
the programme the passive component increases the unemployment duration,
but these eﬀects almost disappear after three years from the entrance in LM
(in particular for younger workers). Anyway the main aim of the programme
is to provide an insurance against an otherwise uninsurable unemployment
risk. Surely it is an important step ahead after others passive policies such
as Cassa integrazione guadagni, for the active component of the programme
which assists the worker during the search of a new job and because with
LM programme workers are deﬁnitely ﬁred, thus they can start to actively
look for a new job. Anyway it is still an important object of study for its
complexity and social impact.
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87Table A.1: Cumulative eﬀects of the variable beneﬁt on a permanent re-employment on men
Variables Months
(reference var.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
younger 0.022 *** 0.012 -0.006 -0.013 -0.017 * -0.020 * -0.028 *** -0.035 *** -0.037 ***
0.007 (0.008 (0.009) (0.010 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
older 0.009 -0.023 * -0.046 *** -0.061 *** -0.072 *** -0.078 *** -0.089 *** -0.087 *** -0.091 ***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Months
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
younger -0.040 *** -0.041 *** -0.033 *** -0.018 -0.018 -0.026 ** -0.032 *** -0.033 *** -0.030 ***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
older -0.098 *** -0.111 *** -0.117 *** -0.112 *** -0.130 *** -0.141 *** -0.152 *** -0.141 *** -0.137 ***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Months
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
younger -0.025 ** -0.023 ** -0.019 * -0.018 * -0.015 -0.010 -0.016 -0.014 -0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
older -0.137 *** -0.137 *** 0.133 *** -0.132 *** -0.130 *** -0.132 *** -0.128 *** -0.127 *** -0.121 ***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Months
28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
younger -0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
older -0.116 *** -0.115 *** -0.110 *** -0.109 *** -0.107 *** -0.102 *** -0.097 *** -0.094 *** -0.087 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Signiﬁcance levels are indicated with asterisks (* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01) Standard errors are indicated in brackets
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8Table A.2: Cumulative eﬀects of the variable beneﬁt on a permanent re-employment on women
Variables Months
(reference variable) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
younger -0.002 -0.014 *** -0.025 *** -0.036 *** -0.039 *** -0.046 *** -0.052 *** -0.053 *** -0.057 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
older -0.011 * -0.042 *** -0.056 *** -0.065 *** -0.075 *** -0.085 *** -0.095 *** -0.102 *** -0.107 ***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Months
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
younger -0.062 *** -0.063 *** -0.058 *** -0.045 *** -0.045 *** -0.055 *** -0.057 *** -0.055 *** -0.058 ***
(0.006 ) (0.007 ) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
older -0.116 *** -0.125 *** -0.124 *** -0.125 *** -0.125 *** -0.129 *** -0.136 *** -0.144 *** -0.148 ***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Months
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
younger -0.054 *** -0.053 *** -0.049 *** -0.045 *** -0.042 *** -0.035 *** -0.033 *** -0.030 *** -0.029 ***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
older -0.150 *** -0.152 *** 0.155 *** -0.153 *** -0.156 *** -0.151 *** -0.148 *** -0.143 *** -0.147 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Months
28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
younger -0.024 *** -0.024 *** -0.023 *** -0.020 ** -0.020 ** -0.018 ** -0.018 ** -0.017 * -0.014 *
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
older -0.147 *** -0.143 *** -0.135 *** -0.132 *** -0.127 *** -0.125 *** -0.116 *** -0.113 *** -0.107 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Signiﬁcance levels are indicated with asterisks (* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01) Standard errors are indicated in brackets
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